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INTRODUCTION
Over the past ten to fifteen years, there has been an explosion of bilat-
eral and regional free trade agreements in Latin America (together, these
are called "preferential free trade agreements" or PTAs). The purpose of
PTAs is to increase trade, regulatory, and investment liberalization. As
effective trade liberalization requires more than just a reduction of tariffs,
PTAs include "chapters" in a number of areas of domestic regulation.
These chapters address domestic regulation and create binding commit-
ments to liberalize domestic regulation that may impact foreign trade.
Among chapters that address domestic regulation, many of the Latin
American PTAs include a chapter on competition policy.' Conventional
wisdom has been that such chapters play a critical role in trade agreements
because they link antitrust with trade liberalization. My claim is that the
conventional wisdom as to the effectiveness of these chapters has been
overstated.
Until now, the effectiveness of antitrust and competition policy chap-
ters has remained unanswered. This article undertakes the first empirical
analysis of Latin American competition policy chapters in PTAs. The study
of competition policy chapters within trade agreements is a highly special-
ized area of law and policy. To explain this phenomenon to a broader audi-
ence, this article begins with some context about both Latin America and
the process of liberalization. Part I provides an overview of the history and
process of liberalization in Latin America. Latin America serves as an in-
teresting case study of developing world economic liberalization because of
the significant structural macroeconomic reforms that it undertook in the
1980s and 1990s. In many cases, microeconomic reforms accompanied
macroeconomic reforms. Many countries included antitrust law within
domestic reforms to encourage liberalization.
Part II is the description and analysis of competition policy chapters
within Latin American PTAs. The standard practice in PTAs is to create
binding commitments that have third-party adjudication for potential dis-
putes. The choice of international institutions, such as PTAs, is based on
the perception of the relative strength of PTAs over purely domestic ap-
proaches. Antitrust agencies enforce antitrust law. However, these agencies
interact in complex ways with other parts of government, including the
1. Though I use the terms somewhat interchangeably, antitrust addresses private restraints of
trade whereas competition policy has a broader focus and includes public (government) and mixed
restraints along with private restraints.
2008)
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legislature, judiciary and sector regulators. In a world of second best alter-
natives, there is a commonly held belief that international institutions may
overcome some of the domestic weaknesses of antitrust while simultane-
ously not introducing more severe international weaknesses than domestic
institutions.2
The common belief is that competition policy chapters are binding.
However, a key finding from this article is that this perception is not born
out by the facts. This article finds that antitrust chapters within PTAs go
against the standard practice of binding commitments. Competition policy
chapters lack binding dispute settlement. All Latin American PTAs lack
dispute settlement for the core antitrust issues of mergers, collusive agree-
ments, and monopolization within the competition policy chapters. This
departure from the standard PTA practice is more striking given that other
chapters in the same trade agreements have binding dispute resolution.
These other chapters include some competition elements, such as services
and intellectual property.
The remainder of Part II explores the findings. It begins with a discus-
sion of the basis for the inclusion of competition policy chapters in PTAs.
It answers whether or not such chapters create compliance and the mecha-
nisms for doing so. This includes a discussion of how antitrust norms are
shaped and diffused. Next, this Part provides an analysis of why PTAs treat
antitrust differently from other areas of domestic regulation, and provides a
number of hypotheses to explain this anomaly. This article looks to a num-
ber of other disciplines, including law and economics and organizational
theory, to explain these various hypotheses. These frameworks help to un-
derstand the effectiveness of aspirational statements in international agree-
ments and of "soft" law organizations that may create compliance without
binding power by helping to shape and implement norms. This Part analo-
gizes competition policy chapters to relational contracting. It explains how
soft law international organizations serve as the equivalent of private order-
ing in contract relations. Thereafter, this Part explains the importance of
symbolism and aspirational goals, as embodied in competition policy chap-
2. The term "institution" has multiple meanings. By an institution, I mean organizational struc-
tures and processes used to reduce transaction costs. These can be formal structures and rules or cus-
toms, norms, and habits. Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AMER. ECON.
REV. 359, 360 (1994) ("Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interac-
tion. They are made up of formal constraints (e.g. rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g.
norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics.
Together, they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies."). In comparing
institutions to each other, Williamson defines this comparative institutional analysis as "an examination
of the comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under alternative gov-
ernance structures." OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 2 (1985).
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ters. The symbolic value has meaning to both foreign and domestic con-
stituencies.
A discussion on the prevalence of cooperation provisions within com-
petition policy chapters follows. This discussion offers a number of expla-
nations for the frequency of such provisions. Subsequently, Part II
examines why antitrust has not replaced anti-dumping agreements. This is a
proposal that over the years has been advocated by a number of scholars.
Finally, this Part explores why the various competition policy chapters look
similar across PTAs.
In the conclusion, I argue that in spite of the non-binding nature of
competition policy chapters in Latin American PTAs, these chapters may
still have value. The value of such chapters is related to how these chapters
may identify, shape, and implement norms of competition policy in Latin
American countries. However, there are limits to these PTAs. Should ex-
pectations for PTAs be too high (given what they can deliver), and should
negotiations over the inclusion of PTAs take up too many resources from
other more pressing tasks that require staff from competition agencies, the
value of their exclusion will exceed the value of their inclusion.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY
A. The Latin American Experience
To understand competition policy chapters within Latin American
PTAs, one must first understand the larger political economic history of
Latin America. This history has broader application. The Latin American
development experience is one that can provide a glimpse of the broader
process of economic liberalization and the challenges that it creates across
regions. Latin America is a dynamic and diverse region, with countries of
different sizes, levels of economic development, and histories. Any attempt
to examine the entire region, as this article does, faces the problem of over-
generalization. With this caveat, one commonality in the region has been
that Latin American countries have fallen well behind those of Western
Europe and East Asia in their economic development.3 This article exam-
ines one aspect of country competitiveness in Latin America and the devel-
opment puzzle, antitrust/competition policy, and how antitrust interfaces
3. For accounts of Latin American economic development, see generally VICTOR BULMER-
THOMAS, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA SINCE INDEPENDENCE (2d ed. 2003); PATRICE
FRANKO, THE PUZZLE OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5-11 (2d ed. 2003); SEBASTIAN
EDWARDS, CRISIS AND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE (1995).
20081
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with economic, trade, and regulatory liberalization to improve growth and
development. 4
The political economy of Latin America historically has been marked
by political instability, ineffective institutions, low levels of the rule of law,
corruption, and state intervention in the economy.5 Adding to this mix of
domestic malfunctions, Latin America has a long history of trade protec-
tionism. During the period from the 1860s until 1914, Latin America had
the highest tariff rates in the world.6 After World War II, many Latin
American countries adopted industrial policies, such as the creation of na-
tional champions or the development of "strategic" sectors, as a way to
jump start modernization and economic growth. 7 Developing world leaders
believed industrial policy would speed up the industrialization process to
catch up with Western Europe and the United States. 8 During the post-
WWII period, a common view that held sway in Latin America was that
isolation from the world economy would lead to greater development
through a process of import substitution. 9 This viewpoint was the combina-
tion of a reaction to the market integration of the 1920s and 1930s that had
spread the effects of the global depression, a belief that governments could
4. A critique of trade liberalization and its limits in terms of distributional effects is beyond the
scope of this article. For a general discussion based on theory and evidence, see, for example, Pinelopi
Koujianou Goldberg & Nina Pavcnik, Distribution Effects of Globalization in Developing Countries
(Bureau for Research and Econ. Analysis of Dev., Working Paper No. 133, 2006), available at
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/bread/papers/working/133.pdf.
5. See Sebastian Edwards, Gerardo Esquivel & Graciela Mdrquez, Introduction to THE DECLINE
OF LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES: GROWTH, INSTITUTIONS, AND CRISES 1-2 (Sebastian Edwards,
Gerardo Esquivel & Graciela Mdrquez eds., 2007). Government intervention in the economy is not a
concept limited to the developing world. This trend affected the developed world as well. Compare
1900 and 1980. In 1900 the state sector in the United States and Western Europe accounted for less than
ten percent of a country's GDP. By 1980, the state sector consumed approximately fifty percent, with
Sweden as high as seventy percent. Francis Fukuyama, The Imperative of State-Building, 15 J.
DEMOCRACY 17, 19 (2004).
6. John H. Coatsworth & Jeffrey G. Williamson, The Roots of Latin American Protectionism:
Looking Before the Great Depression, in INTEGRATING THE AMERICAS: FTAA AND BEYOND 37, 37,
45-46 (Antoni Estevadeordal, Dani Rodrik, Alan M. Taylor & Andr~s Velasco eds., 2004) [hereinafter
INTEGRATING THE AMERICAS]. High tariff rates impacted the ability of Latin America to benefit from
the first wave of globalization that began in the 1890s. This affected Latin America's overall growth.
During the period of 1875-1908, there was a negative net effect of tariffs upon growth for Latin Amer-
ica. Antoni Estevadeordal, Dani Rodrik, Alan M. Taylor & Andr~s Velasco, Introduction to
INTEGRATING THE AMERICAS, supra, at 7.
7. See generally FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO & ENzO FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 149-71 (Marjory Mattingly Urquidi trans., University of California
Press 1979) (1971); FRANKO, supra note 3, at 51-74, 223-58.
8. Kemal Dervis & John M. Page, Jr., Industrial Policy in Developing Countries, 8 J. COMP.
ECON. 436, 436 (1984).
9. Hugo A. Hopenayn & Pablo A. Neumeyer, Latin America in the ,XYth Century: Stagnation,
then Collapse 1-2 (Econometric Soc'y, Latin Am. Meeting Paper No. 326, 2004), available at
http://repec.org/esLATM04/up.28921.1082602077.pdf (arguing that import substitution led to the
relative stagnation of Latin America),
[Vol 83:1236
NON-ENFORCEABLE CHAPTERS IN FREE TRADE A GREEMENTS
allocate resources more effectively than the market, and a belief that the
legacy of colonialism created structural biases against developing world
countries. 10
In a departure from stateism and import substitution, Latin American
countries undertook policies of economic liberalization during the 1980s
and 1990s, sometimes through pressure from lending institutions and de-
veloped world countries. 11 This change had profound effects for the eco-
nomic organization of Latin American countries. It also provides us with a
critical understanding of why antitrust laws and agencies were created
throughout the region during that period. Economic liberalization
unleashed competitive forces through the market as the organizing force for
daily interactions. 12 Liberalization in turn led to improved governance,
accountability, and transparency. 13 The creation of appropriate, market
supporting legal and regulatory institutions to produce economic growth
takes on a new priority as a result of liberalization. 14 These supports in-
clude the rule of law, 15 effective institutions, 16 good governance, 17 low
10. See Robert Z. Lawrence, Regionalism, Multilateralism and Deeper Integration: Changing
Paradigms for Developing Countries, in TRADE RULES IN THE MAKING: CHALLENGES IN REGIONAL
AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 24 (Miguel Rodriguez Mendoza, Patrick Low & Barbara
Kotschwar eds., 1999). What this development model overlooked was that government failure might be
worse than market failure. Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64
AM. ECON. REV. 291, 301-02 (1974).
11. Nevertheless, liberalization did not seem to overcome significant economic inequality in Latin
America. Miguel Szrkely, The 1990s in Latin America: Another Decade of Persistent Inequality, but
with Somewhat Lower Poverty, 6 J. APPLIED ECON. 317, 317 (2003) ("[T]here is no country in Latin
American where inequality declined during the 1990s.").
12. Jakob de Haan, Susanna Lundstrom & Jan-Egbert Sturm, Market-Oriented Institutions and
Policies and Economic Growth: A Critical Survey, 20 J. ECON. SURVEYS 157, 157-58 (2006) (survey-
ing the literature on economic growth and liberalization).
13. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A CHANGING WORLD
61-75 (1997). This does not suggest that the market eliminates rent seeking. Rent seeking continued
within Latin American during the period of liberalization. See Hector E. Shamis, Distributional Coali-
tions and the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America, 51 WORLD POL. 236, 239-40 (1999).
However, the negative impact on societal welfare of rent seeking under a market system may be lower
than rent seeking under a market replacement role by government.
14. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 9 (1990). Liberalization creates economic dislocation for privileged groups. Williamson
notes that some groups, such as unions, would be surprised to think of themselves as privileged elites.
See John Williamson, What Should the World Bank Think About the Washington Consensus?, 15
WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 251, 258 (2000).
15. Sergio Godoy & Joseph Stiglitz, Growth, Initial Conditions, Law and Speed of Privatization
in Transition Countries: 11 Years Later 20 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
11992, 2006) (revising earlier literature on privatizations to suggest that legal institutions are very
important and that other factors, such as quick privatization and liberalization, have only a modest
marginal effect); Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Pablo Zoido-Lobat6n, Governance Matters: From
Measurement to Action, FIN. & DEV., June 2000, at 10, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft
/fandd/2000/06/pdf/kauf.pdf. But see John K. M. Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, Economic Development,
and the Developmental States of Northeast Asia, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST
2008]
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costs to doing business, 18 secure property rights, 19 and the ability to en-
force agreements. 2 0
One element of domestic economic reform is trade liberalization.
Trade liberalization can increase competition and lower prices, which com-
pliment antitrust law in improving consumer welfare. 21 When international
firms enter (or threaten to enter) markets and offer their products and ser-
vices at a lower price, this in turn forces domestic firms to lower their
prices to the market equilibrium.22 Increased trade liberalization occurs
both as a unilateral policy response and through more formal trade agree-
ments. 23 Countries undertake trade liberalization as a means to increase
growth and development. Countries within Latin American have small
economies with high levels of industry concentration. Higher concentration
and a lack of effective entry by foreign goods may allow for monopoly
profits by existing domestic firms.24 Increased international trade has the
ASIA 91, 112 (Christoph Antons ed., 2003) (questioning some of these assumptions based on the East
Asian development context).
16. See NORTH, supra note 14, at 7; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369,
1395-96 (2001); Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The Pri-
macy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH
131, 132, 135 (2004).
17. See Kaufman et al., supra note 15, at 1-2.
18. WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2007: HOW TO REFORM 43-47 (2006).
19. See YORAM BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE STATE: ECONOMIC RIGHTS, LEGAL RIGHTS, AND THE
SCOPE OF THE STATE 157-58, 165-66 (2002); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 47-57, 221-24 (2000); NORTH,
supra note 14, at 52.
20. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments,
in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 175, 175-76 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley
eds., 2005) (surveying the literature); NORTH, supra note 14, at 54 ("[T]he inability of societies to
develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of both historical
stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.").
21. On the benefits of trade liberalization, see generally DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER
FIRE 22-24, 35-39 (2002); L. Alan Winters, Trade Liberalisation and Economic Performance: An
Overview, 114 ECON. J. F4, F5-11 (2004). However, trade liberalization benefits developing world
countries more than developed world countries. See Farhad Rassekh, Is International Trade More
Beneficial to Lower Income Economies? An Empirical Inquiry, 11 REV. DEV. ECON. 159, 167 (2007).
22. Sometimes the mere threat of entry may be enough to lower prices. See William J. Baumol &
Kyu Sik Lee, Contestable Markets, Trade, and Development, 6 WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 1,
9, 13 (1991).
23. For an overview on the international trade system, see generally the excellent MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 20-25 (3d ed. 2005).
24. MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES (2003). This is not
to suggest that a high market share automatically means anticompetitive behavior. Indeed, the focus on
market shares is a somewhat imprecise tool. Dennis W. Carlton, Market Definition: Use and Abuse, 3
COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 3, 3-4 (2007).
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potential to transform this situation. Trade openness allows for lower prices
through greater access to the tradable sector. 25
The biggest barriers to trade in the Western Hemisphere remain tariff
barriers. 26 Nevertheless, increasingly there has been a recognition that for
trade agreements to be effective, trade liberalization must include provi-
sions for domestic regulatory liberalization. 27 Trade agreements thus have
been used to as a lever to push for domestic economic liberalization in
regulatory areas, and to reduce the role of the state. 28 However, many of
these changes have been incomplete, particularly those requiring "second
generation" institutional reforms of market facilitating institutions to in-
crease domestic institutional capacity, the better to preserve "first genera-
tion" reforms in fiscal matters and labor markets. 29 To ensure that the
process of liberalization leads to a more pro-competitive economic envi-
ronment, rather than a perpetuation of inefficient systems that privilege
elite interests, many Latin American countries have created antitrust laws
and agencies to enforce them.30 Hence, there is a link between both trade
and economic liberalization. Not surprisingly, it was during the period of
increased liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s that most countries enacted
competition laws. 31
25. Trade increases the total pie, but some may lose as a result of the distribution of that increased
pie. See DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? 8 (1997). There has been a backlash
from the movement to free markets domestically within Latin America. From 1998-2002, the percent-
age of people in Latin America that believed that privatization had benefited their country dropped from
forty-six to twenty-eight percent. Sunita Kikeri & Aishetu Fatima Kolo, Privatization: Trends and
Recent Developments 22-23 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, Paper No. 3765, 2006).
26. See Mario Berrios, Jaime Granados, Marcos S. Jank, Josefina Monteagudo & Masakazu
Watanuki, Prospects and Challenges for the Liberalization of Agricultural Trade in the Western Hemi-
sphere, in INTEGRATING THE AMERICAS, supra note 6, at 282-83; see also JAMES R. MARKUSEN, JAMES
R. MELVIN, WILLIAM M. KAEMPFER & KEITH E. MASKUS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE 273-76 (1995) (discussing tariff problems generally).
27. WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS 1-3 (2000).
28. Investments are yet another area of importance for liberalized markets, but are beyond the
scope of this article. See generally Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The
Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 6, 19 (2003); Ren6 M.
Stulz, The Limits of Financial Globalization, 60 J. FIN. 1595 (2005).
29. John Williamson, Overview: An Agenda for Restarting Growth and Reform, in AFTER THE
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS: RESTARTING GROWTH AND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 1, 5-6 (Pedro-
Pablo Kuczynski & John Williamson eds., 2003). On the importance of macroeconomic stability, see
generally Stanley Fischer, The Role of Macroeconomic Factors in Growth (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 4565, 1993).
30. A.E. Rodriguez & Lesley DeNardis, Examining the Performance of Competition Policy
Enforcement Agencies: A Cross-Country Comparison, 13. J. BUS. & ECON. STUD. 1, 14-16 (2007).
Further research is needed to explain this process. Public choice suggests it would be difficult to under-
cut or threaten the status quo where the strong interests of the few manifest more readily in policy
decisions than do the interests of the dispersed majority. Yet, antitrust laws and their establishment
seem contrary to the typical public choice story.
31. Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Law on a Global Scale: Races Up, Down, and Sideways, in
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 349 (Daniel
2008]
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B. Antitrust and Its Role in Economic Development
Antitrust is a regulatory tool to improve societal well-being. Antitrust
is a regulatory response to a market-based organization of the economy.32
As such, antitrust law is the backstop to correct market malfunctions. The
market malfunction central to antitrust is the exercise of monopoly
power.33 Antitrust and competition policy work within the larger develop-
ment context to create a more competitive environment and to encourage
growth and productivity.34 Antitrust law combats anticompetitive practices
such as collusion between competitors, anticompetitive mergers, or an
abuse of a dominant position or monopolization.
Antitrust has the potential to play an important role in greater eco-
nomic development through the creation of a competitive market in Latin
America.35 Antitrust enforcement encourages higher economic growth. As
antitrust reduces entry barriers, incumbent firms can no longer be supported
through monopoly rents.36 As a result of competition, firms become more
efficient. 37 As trade and regulatory liberalization reduce some of the most
obvious government barriers such as tariffs, the remaining government
barriers-mixed government and private anticompetitive behavior-
become more important concerns. These factors have made the implemen-
tation of effective antitrust more pressing. However, antitrust does not op-
erate within a vacuum. Antitrust enforcement is a function of the prevailing
economics and politics of any country at any given time.38 In the United
C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001) ("More than half of [competition] laws were adopted in the last
decade."); Joel Davidow & Hal Shapiro, The Feasibility and Worth of a World Trade Organization
Competition Agreement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 49, 53 (2003).
32. Trade and antitrust have become increasingly linked as they both address issues of market
liberalization. Trade openness reduces public (government) restraints, whereas antitrust addresses issues
of private, mixed, and in some cases, public restraints.
33. This article does not engage in the debate on consumer welfare versus total welfare standards
for antitrust.
34. Michael E. Porter, Building the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity: Findings from the
Business Competitiveness Index, in WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT
2003-2004, at 29, 31 (2004).
35. Some argue that the role of antitrust in economic liberalization is rather limited. See, e.g., A.
E. Rodriguez & Malcolm B. Coate, Limits to Antitrust Policy for Reforming Economies, 18 HOUS. J.
INT'L L. 311, 317, 327, 358 (1996). Because of data limitations, there is no way to quantitatively test
this hypothesis. However, anecdotally, even if one were to accept that antitrust enforcement may be of
limited value, antitrust can play a critical role in economic development in the area of competition
advocacy.
36. See generally WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 97-125 (2002) (discussing reducing barriers to trade through transport costs).
37. Mark A. Dutz & Maria Vagliasindi, Competition Policy Implementation in Transition Econo-
mies: An Empirical Assessment, 44 EURO. ECON. REV. 762, 771 (2000).
38. William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal
Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 43, 58 (2000) (discussing the American experience).
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States, the law and economics of antitrust is at its basis a "Chicago school"
focus on price and quantity.39 Current antitrust policy and court rulings
have further refined the Chicago school approach to correct some of its
limitations based on real-world experiences. 40 In Latin America, antitrust
policy is mixed. A number of agencies have adopted an approach based on
the U.S. model. In other cases, Latin American competition policy follows
more along the lines of an EU-based approach.4 1 In addition to substantive
differences in the law and economics of antitrust between the U.S. and EU
approaches, the EU has a more comprehensive goal of political and eco-
nomic integration, which the U.S. antitrust approach lacks. 42 The varying
approaches to antitrust in Latin America reflect the types of cases that arise,
differing enforcement priorities, and the capacities of Latin American
agencies to intervene to assist the market.
II. ADDRESSING INTERNATIONAL ISSUES IN COMPETITION POLICY
The role of antitrust and markets are questions of institutional choice
as to the best way to organize society. 43 In choosing the most appropriate
institution to govern behavior, one must examine each of the institutional
alternatives to determine which institution vis-A-vis other institutional
choices is best placed to improve societal welfare. 44 When institutions con-
front both domestic and global issues, such as in antitrust, any inquiry must
include an examination of both domestic and international institutions. The
study of institutions is dynamic rather than static. Institutions shift when
institutional actors calculate that the benefits of such a shift outweigh the
39. Fred. S. McChesney, Talking 'Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition for and in the Field
of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1407 (2003).
40. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 37-38
(2005). Hovenkamp refers to this as the "new Harvard" position. William Kovacic refers to U.S. anti-
trust law as a double helix of intertwined Harvard and Chicago strands. William E. Kovacic, The Intel-
lectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard
Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 13-14.
41. Eleanor Fox explains the U.S. and EU conceptual antitrust paradigms in Eleanor M. Fox, What
Is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371,
372, 392 (2002). See generally Karl Aiginger, Mark McCabe, Dennis C. Mueller & Christoph Weiss,
Do American and European Industrial Organization Economists Differ?, 19 REV. INDUS. ORG. 383
(2001).
42. DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING
PROMETHEUS, at vii, 1 (1998).
43. On institutional analysis, see THRAINN EGGERTSSON, IMPERFECT INSTITUTIONS:
POSSIBILITIES & LIMITS OF REFORM 1 (2005). See generally NORTH, supra note 14; THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY, at xi-xiii (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee eds., 1998).
44. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY, at ix (1994); NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW
AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS, at x (2001).
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costs. 4 5 With a new period of increased globalization and the proliferation
of international trade agreements with antitrust provisions, an examination
of Latin American antitrust institutions is particularly salient.
As a result of the institutional, financial, and human capacity con-
straints of domestic antitrust agencies, countries may prefer to utilize inter-
national institutions to protect the competitive process and to augment and
strengthen domestic institutions. This section analyses the strengths and
weaknesses of these international institutions by means of their domestic
and international alternatives. One prevalent international response to do-
mestic institutional malfunction has been the creation of more formal,
treaty-like instruments that are "hard law." At the global level, this is the
realm of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the Latin American
context, hard law institutions are PTAs. There has been an increasing shift
in recent years to enter into PTAs.46 Many agreements within the recent
wave of PTAs have included competition policy chapters.
Some Latin American PTAs are deeper in scope. They create market
integration, regulatory convergence, and customs unions among their
members. In Latin America, three such supra-national institutions exist that
contain provisions regarding competition policy-CARICOM, the Andean
Community, and Mercosur. Because of the infrequent use of deeper inte-
gration customs unions or formal cooperation agreements across antitrust
agencies, these are beyond the scope of this article. 47
Hard law is an international institutional response based on binding
commitments to create domestic compliance. 48 These commitments have
45. See generally NORTH, supra note 14.
46. See generally Jo-Ann Crawford & Roberto V. Fiorentino, The Changing Landscape of Re-
gional Trade Agreements (World Trade Org. Discussion Paper, Paper No. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res e/bookspe/discussion-papers8_e.pdf.
47. For an overview of the competition policy implications of these regional trade agreements see,
for example, Jos6 Tavares de Araujo Jr., Politica de Concorrdncia no Mercosul: Uma Agenda Minima
[Competition Policy in MERCOSUR: A Minimum Agenda], in EL DESAFiO DE INTEGRARSE PARA
CRECER: BALANCE Y PERSPECTIVAS DEL MERCOSUR EN SU PRIMERA DECADA 154 (Daniel Chud-
novsky & Jos6 Maria Fanelli eds., 2001); Andr6 Filipe Zago de Azevedo, Mercosur Agreement on
Competition Policy-How Effective Has It Been and How to Promote Further Cooperation? (Competi-
tion Policy Foundations for Trade Reform, Regulatory Reform and Sustainable Development, Work
Package No. 4, Deliverable 23, 2005), available at http://www.cpftr.org/cpftr/deliverables/Deliverable
23.pdf; Andr6 Filipe Zago de Azevedo, Mercosur: Ambitious Policies, Poor Practices, 24 BRAZILIAN J.
POL. ECON. 584 (2004), available at http://www.rep.org.br/pdf/96-8.pdf; Ram6n Garcia-Gallardo &
Maria Dolores Dominguez Perez, La reforma de la norma de competencia en la Comunidad Andina, 20
BOLETiN LATINOAMERICANO DE COMPETENCIA 44 (2005); A. Vindelyn Smith-Hillman, First a Glim-
mer, Now a... ? The Prospect of a Caribbean Competition Policy, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 405, 407
(2006); Taimoon Stewart, Is Flexibility Needed When Designing Competition Law for Small Open
Economies? A View from the Caribbean, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 725 (2004).
48. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT'L ORG. 421, 421 (2000).
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third-party adjudication requirements to ensure compliance. Binding inter-
national commitments may solve problems of compliance by non-executive
parts of government to policy positions by creating pre-commitments in
policy. 49 International agreements thus lock in domestic policy choices. 50
Because Latin American countries are in need of foreign investment, bind-
ing commitments may be the impetus necessary to create more attractive
investment conditions.
Domestic liberalization and regulatory reform efforts may face
pushback from entrenched interests. 51 This makes liberalization more diffi-
cult if a well-developed antitrust agency is not in place to safeguard the
competitive process. Given the capacity constraints of many of Latin
America's antitrust agencies, there are significant limits on the ability of
these agencies to serve as guardians of the competitive process. 52 Binding
commitments may keep liberalization efforts in place beyond the current
government that signed such commitments. This may help to overcome
public choice concerns over the retrenchment of these policies due to inter-
est group pressures. As Bidsall and Lawrence observe:
When developing countries enter into modem trade agreements, they of-
ten make certain commitments to particular domestic policies-for ex-
ample, to antitrust or other competition policy. Agreeing to such policies
can be in the interests of developing countries (beyond the trade benefits
directly obtained) because the commitment can reinforce the internal re-
form process. Indeed, participation in an international agreement can
make feasible internal reforms that are beneficial for the country as a
whole that might otherwise be successfully resisted by interest groups.53
49. See id. at 430.
50. Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition, 52
EMORY L.J. 1353, 1373 (2003) ("Thus, regulatory globalization can be used by (relatively) weak regu-
latory agencies as a strategy to accomplish objectives that they are unable to accomplish domestically.
It is in this sense that regulatory globalization can be used as a policy lever."). This is not to suggest that
hard law does not have disadvantages. It is less flexible than non-binding international commitments in
reacting to different circumstances and levels of development. An international binding set of rules
might impose standards that do not fit within the particular context of individual countries' legal and
economic traditions.
51. The speed of regulatory liberalization matters. Sometimes reforms are both gradual in effect
and in scope. This means that the liberalization process may be only piecemeal and only loosely coordi-
nated. As North suggests, the vast majority of change is incremental rather than episodic. NORTH, supra
note 14, at 89.
52. See, for example, the relatively weak ranking regarding competition policy in WORLD
ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2005-2006: POLICIES UNDERPINNING
RISING PROSPERITY (2006).
53. Nancy Birdsall & Robert Z. Lawrence, Deep Integration and Trade Agreements: Good for
Developing Countries?, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 136-37 (Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc A. Stern eds., 1999).
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Without binding international commitments, such reforms may never
become firmly embedded. What makes competition law different from
many other areas of law covered by PTAs is that competition law has gen-
eral application. There are no natural constituent groups for competition
law. Conventional wisdom suggests that competition policy chapters in
PTAs serve to strengthen domestic antitrust systems by creating an interna-
tional lever to push reforms and commitments that domestic interest groups
otherwise might resist.
An alternative institutional structure to hard law is "soft law," or
commitments that are not formally binding. Soft law may lead to increased
compliance through norm creation. Soft law organizations in antitrust have
been effective in addressing coordination and procedural harmonization.
Soft law has been less effective on issues of substantive disagreement in
antitrust. 54 There are a number of rationales for the choice of soft law over
hard law. Soft law is different from hard law across three different areas:
obligation, precision, and delegation. In contrast to hard law, soft law obli-
gations are not formally binding. Soft law's lack of precision makes it more
malleable than hard law. Moreover, unlike hard law, soft law has non-
binding delegation. When an executive has time constraints on reaching an
agreement or legislative support is uncertain, non-binding agreements may
be a way to reach agreement to address international issues. 55
Both hard and soft laws require norm diffusion to create credible
commitments. Norms impact the ability of domestic and international insti-
tutions to implement best practices and improve the competitive environ-
ment of an economy. Norm diffusion in antitrust creates a continuous
adjustment to market and political conditions. At the domestic level, collec-
tive economic thinking, experimentation in case selection and enforcement
actions, and the capacity of agencies improve over time. This holds as
much for the U.S. as for younger antitrust agencies. 56 Hard law and soft
law can facilitate this process by identifying norms and assisting domestic
antitrust agencies to successfully adopt and implement them.57
54. For an overview of the effectiveness of soft law antitrust organizations, see generally D.
Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a
Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 37, 97-116 (2007).
55. See Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EuR. J. INT'L L. 579,
592 (2005). This article will explore the choice of soft law versus hard law in the discussion section of
Part If(D), which analyses data from coding Latin American competition policy chapters within PTAs.
56. William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms,
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 477 (2003) ("The story of modem U.S. federal enforcement has far more to do
with the progressive, cumulative development of policy than with abrupt, discontinuous adjustments in
shaping the content of federal agency activity over time.").
57. On the relationship generally between international and domestic institutions, see generally
LOCATING THE PROPER AUTHORITIES: THE INTERACTION OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
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A. Preferential Trade Agreements
A preferential trade agreement (PTA) is a choice of hard law at the
sub-global level. At the global level, hard law in an antitrust context would
mean coverage under the WTO. However, there is no antitrust-specific
binding WTO commitment. Indeed, countries removed antitrust from the
topics for discussion among the current round of WTO negotiations in
2003. A PTA involves the choice of a third-party adjudicator to interpret
and implement commitments at the international level, rather than legisla-
tors or agencies at the domestic level. 58 Built into this choice is the assump-
tion that binding commitments can help overcome domestic issues of
regulatory capture by interest groups. 59
PTAs may have additional benefits, such as reducing time inconsis-
tency, allowing for signaling among parties, providing insurance, and in-
creasing coordination. 60 Under the time inconsistency problem, a
government may be tempted to undertake certain trade-reducing policies
when superior policy options are not available. 61 By binding themselves to
agreements, countries provide insurance that they will comply with these
commitments. It also provides insurance that the other signatory will follow
its own policies. Through the PTA process and the provisions included
therein, countries may establish relationships to increase their coordination
on substantive and procedural issues, thereby reducing transaction costs.
B. Competition Policy Chapters in PTAs-Trade Agreements as
Contracts
1. Background and Objectives
The rationale to sign a PTA is that the agreement makes the signato-
ries to such agreements better off than the lack thereof.62 This occurs
INSTITUTIONS (Daniel W. Drezner ed., 2003); HELEN V. MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
INFORMATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3-5 (1997); Robert D. Putnam,
Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 433-35 (1988).
58. See Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT'L
L. 631,641 (2005).
59. See Andrew Moravcsik, A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International
Cooperation, 53 INT'L ORG. 267, 284, 301 (1999).
60. Raquel Fernndez & Jonathan Portes, Returns to Regionalism: An Analysis of Nontraditional
Gains from Regional Trade Agreements, 12 WORLD BANK ECON. REv. 197, 200 (1998).
61. Robert W. Staiger, International Rules and Institutions for Cooperative Trade Policy, in 3
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 1497-547 (Gene M. Grossman & Kenneth Rogoff eds.,
1995).
62. Punishment also may be easier in a PTA than in the WTO. Fernandez & Portes, supra note 60,
at 205. New PTAs have increased foreign direct investment in PTA signatories. One recent study by
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through a reduction of tariff and regulatory barriers on the goods and ser-
vices of PTA signatories for fellow signatories. 63 This section examines
competition policy chapters in PTAs and the provisions within these chap-
ters. Competition policy chapters are chapters within binding trade agree-
ments between the signatory countries. NAFTA was among the first of
what has become a rapid explosion of Latin American PTAs in the past ten
to fifteen years. 64 These PTAs have allowed for experimentation across a
number of areas, since some provisions include commitments in addition to
those found at the WTO level. This experimentation includes the use of
competition policy chapters in PTAs. The lack of WTO commitments in
competition policy makes the study of competition policy chapters in Latin
American PTAs critical to understanding what a future WTO competition
policy may resemble. It also provides a glimpse into the types of limitations
that WTO antitrust rules may have. Because of the lack of a WTO-level
antitrust agreement, PTAs identify the upper limits of the types of com-
mitments that countries are willing to place upon themselves.
The conventional wisdom about competition policy PTAs is that such
chapters can serve as a template for a WTO-level competition policy
Medvedev suggests that PTA membership seems to have two important effects. The first effect is the
increase in foreign direct investment resulting from signing the agreement. The second effect is based
on the market size of the PTA. The larger and faster-growing the market, the greater the impact of net
foreign direct investment inflows. Denis Medvedev, Beyond Trade: The Impact of Preferential Trade
Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 1, 7-8 (World Bank Pol'y Research Working Paper,
Paper No. 4065, 2006). However, countries signed many of the Latin American regional trade agree-
ments (RTAs) during a period of reduced foreign direct investment, which declined fifty-three percent
between 1999 and 2003 in Latin America and the Caribbean. This trend reversed in 2004, when foreign
direct investment inflows to the region increased by thirty-seven percent to sixty-nine billion dollars.
OFFICE OF TRADE, GROWTH AND COMPETITIVENESS, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES [OAS],
TRADE ISSUES OF CONCERN TO CIVIL SOCIETY 3 (2005).
63. Yet, PTAs come at a cost. A plethora of overlapping PTAs across countries creates increased
information and transaction costs. Doing business in multiple countries leads to increased complexity.
In a dispute settlement context, different conclusions may be reached under different PTA dispute
settlement adjudications, or within the same agreement across different chapters. See Susan D. Franck,
The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through
Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1521-22 (2005).
64. JOSt M. SALAZAR-XIRINACHS, IMPLICATIONS OF PROLIFERATING SUB-REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 3 (2001), available at http://www.
pecc.org/publications/trade-papers.htm. While this current wave of PTAs is important, it is not the first
wave of trade agreements and regionalism in Latin America. The current wave of regionalism in Latin
America has a different structure to it than the "old" regionalism of the 1960s and 1970s. The premise
behind old regionalism was import substitution, the promotion of trade diversion, the placing of limits
on foreign direct investment, a focus on South-South agreements, and a lack of dispute settlement and
industrial policy. Robert Devlin & Paolo Giordano, The Old and New Regionalism: Benefits, Costs, and
Implications for the FTAA, in INTEGRATING THE AMERICAS, supra note 6, at 145-47. New regionalism,
which includes the current wave of agreements, can be characterized by its three central tenants: trade
openness, structural economic reforms, and compatibility with the international system. Id. at 143.
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agreement. 65 PTAs may create advocates of a robust competition policy at
the global level, and through the development of PTA case law, may serve
as laboratories of experimentation for how competition policy at a global
level could play out.66 Countries join PTAs in part to increase their bar-
gaining power with third countries. This may improve the possibility that
these agreements can help set standards above those currently in the WTO.
PTAs may shape future WTO negotiations specific to competition policy. 67
Indeed, during the period during which many of the PTAs were negotiated
and signed, the WTO had a working group on the interface of international
trade and competition policy to discuss potential inclusion of competition
policy issues within the WTO. 68
Though these assumptions are often repeated at both the hemispheric
level (such as in the Free Trade Area of the Americans, or FTAA) and at
the global level (as in the WTO), no empirical analysis has been undertaken
to see if the PTA competition policy chapters back up this conventional
wisdom. This void in empirical scholarship has profound policy conse-
quences, 69 and this article seeks to fill the void specific to competition pol-
icy chapters. The findings of such an analysis will help to provide greater
certainty to policy makers when they consider how to augment domestic
antitrust institutions, whether their focus is to pursue competition policy
objectives through Latin American PTAs or, alternatively, to focus efforts
on soft law international organizations. These findings also have implica-
tions for donor institutions, specifically whether scarce resources for anti-
trust capacity building should be spent on trade agreement compliance or in
65. See, e.g., Peter Holmes et al., Trade and Competition in RTAs: A Missed Opportunity?, in
U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: How
to Assure Development Gains, 65-89, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2005/1 (2005) (prepared by
Philippe Brusick, Ana Maria Alvarez & Lucian Cernat), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
ditcclp2005 l-en.pdf.
66. However, overlapping PTAs may create additional transaction costs. For example, country A
may bring suit against countries B and C for non-discrimination violations arising from a designated
monopoly. However, even though the type of anticompetitive behavior may be the same and the same
parent company may be the source of that behavior in both countries B and C, each instance of conduct
will be subject to a different dispute settlement under different PTAs. Parties cannot be joined across
PTAs. Outcomes of claims over the same facts may also be inconsistent as different panels under
different PTAs may rule in contradictory ways regarding similar provisions. This increases costs, as the
same issues need to be litigated in two different fora.
67. WILLIAM R. CLINE, TRADE POLICY AND GLOBAL POVERTY 291-92 (2004). Some argue that
PTAs hurt rather than help multilateral trade negotiations. See, e.g., Phillip I. Levy, A Political-
Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements, 87 AMER. ECON. REV. 506 (1997).
68. PHIMfP MARSDEN, A COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE WTO 132 -37 (2003).
69. See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial
Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 820-21; David A. Hyman, Rescue
Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REV. 653, 656 (2006).
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other areas. 70 This article makes the theoretical claim that PTA competition
policy chapters and their provisions serve as a checklist of issues that coun-
tries have identified as needing increased capacity-building in related do-
mestic institutions, and for which international institutions can also play a
role.
2. PTAs as Contracts Between Countries
Recent empirical contract law scholarship has enriched the under-
standing of contracts and the terms and meanings of contractual obliga-
tions. 71 The purpose of a formal contract is to create a set of rights and
obligations between the contracting parties; to reduce opportunism, imper-
fect information, and economic friction; and to create mechanisms to ad-
dress issues of potential breach. 72 By formalizing an agreement, the
contract creates mechanisms to encourage investment. 73 To reduce the
strategic opportunism that might arise from contracts, parties choose an
institutional governance structure to enforce contractual rights.74 Opportun-
ism functions to increase transaction costs. 75 "As transactions become more
complex and the environment more uncertain, the limitations of contracting
as a safeguard against opportunism grow, increasing the attraction of other
70. Communicating the importance of empirical findings has been a difficult task for empirical
legal scholarship. Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective Commu-
nication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part 1, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1813-14 (2006).
71. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002)
(discussing the key role that staggered boards play in U.S. antitakeover protections); Stephen J. Choi &
G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53
EMORY L.J. 929, 929-38 (2004) (discussing sovereign bond contracts); Victor Fleischer, Brand New
Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1582-86 (2006)
(discussing branding effects of deals involving Google, Ben & Jerry's, and Apple); George S. Geis,
Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 961-63 (2007)
(discussing the effects of outsourcing on costs); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capi-
tal, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315 (2005) (discussing venture-backed company data in analyzing the way
venture capitalists mitigate conflicts in exit strategies).
72. See generally VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
(2006); Steven Shavell, Contracts, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 436-44 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After
Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 842-43 (2003) (discussing the potential for
breach between parties with unequal bargaining positions).
73. See PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY (2005); Oliver Hart &
John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
12706, 2006).
74. See generally Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect
World: What To Do When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete Contracts,
2004 WIS. L. REV. 323, 327-28 (generally discussing opportunism in contracts); Louis Makowski &
Joseph M. Ostroy, Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the Market, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 479,
481, 491 (2001) (same).
75. See Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with Fewer
Words?, 79 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 889, 897-98 (2004).
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institutional arrangements that better support adaptive, sequential decision
making while circumscribing or redirecting opportunistic tendencies. '76
This opportunism replicates itself in the trade agreement context.
A trade agreement has important similarities to a contract as a means
to combat opportunism through a binding agreement. As the WTO appel-
late body explained in Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages:
The WTO Agreement is a treaty-the international equivalent of a con-
tract. It is self-evident that in an exercise of their sovereignty, and in pur-
suit of their own respective national interests, the Members of the WTO
have made a bargain. In exchange for the benefits they expect to derive
as Members of the WTO, they have agreed to exercise their sovereignty
according to the commitments they have made in the WTO Agreement.7 7
As the WTO itself has suggested, there is a strong link between trade
agreements and contracts. Contract theory therefore can provide insights
into the meaning of trade agreements.
Transaction cost economics provides one mode of analysis to under-
stand contracts and trade agreement provisions. Transaction cost economics
''pairs the assumption of bounded rationality with a self-interest-seeking
assumption that makes allowance for guile." 78 Transaction costs exist be-
cause it is difficult to plan for all possible future contingencies. Even if
such planning were possible, it is difficult to draft language that would
incorporate such contingencies. An additional factor that creates contrac-
tual transaction costs is that even with a fully contingent contract, a third-
party adjudicator would need to make sense of such an agreement. 79 All of
these factors make contracts incomplete. 80
76. Scott E. Masten, About Oliver E. Williamson, in FIRMS, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: THE
TRANSACTIONAL COST ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 41 (Glenn R. Carroll & David J. Teece eds., 1999).
77. Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 13-14, WT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DSIO/AB/R, WT/DSI 1/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
78. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 139 (Robert Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989).
79. For literature reviews on transaction cost economics, see generally Howard A. Shelanski &
Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 335, 336-38 (1995); Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D. Richman, Transaction Cost Eco-
nomics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences 1-2 (Duke Law Sch. Legal Stud-
ies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 115, 2006).
80. See OLIVER D. HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURES 1-2, 72-82 (1995);
Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289, 289
(2006). A second element that makes contracts incomplete is that parties may behave strategically and
breach the contract at a level below that in which the other party may pursue formal legal remedies. See
George L. Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under the Uniform
Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960, 963-68 (1978).
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Like a contract, a trade agreement is an incomplete agreement. 81
However, there are some crucial differences. Countries cannot write bind-
ing contracts in the same manner as private parties to a transaction.
82
Unlike certain types of contracts in which the initial contract may be rene-
gotiated, it is rare for trade agreements to be renegotiated. The mechanisms
of trade agreements and their sanctioning effects for non-compliance are
different from those found in contracts. For example, damages for contrac-
tual breach are to compensate the non-breaching party.83 In a trade agree-
ment, a violation by one party does not lead to an outcome that makes both
parties whole. 84 Instead, one party must "cease and desist." A country is
not punished for past violations. Rather, a country in breach can have its
trade concessions suspended in an amount equal to the amount of the ongo-
ing violation. When the violation ends, so do the sanctions. 85 This form of
remedy is analogous to liquidated damages in contracts. 86
81. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World Trad-
ing System: Democratic Governance and Competition Culture in the WTO, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 585,
593 (2004).
82. Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EURO. J. INT'L L. 579, 580-
81(2005).
83. Some would argue that this encourages "efficient" breach, where the parties and society
overall are better off than if there were no breach. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 133 (5th ed. 1998); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the
Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 558-63 (1977) (discussing the theory of "efficient breach," noting that
"[g]enerally, breach will occur where the breaching party anticipates that paying compensation and
allocating his resources to alternative uses will make him 'better off than performing his obligation.").
Efficient breach remains for the most part a theoretical approach without any real world results to
substantiate it.-"[w]hile some of the early literature attempted to identify the legal remedy that would
satisfy the 'efficient breach' condition with the lowest possible transaction costs, empirical evidence on
actual transaction costs is largely nonexistent, and that literature is best described as inconclusive."
Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 99 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., forthcoming 2007) (internal citations
omitted), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/chapter.draft v 16.pdf.
84. Guzman, supra note 82, at 604 ("The non-zero-sum nature of sanctions in the international
arena is a fundamental difference between international agreements and private contracts ....").
85. There may be reasons to prefer this system in the trade context. A sanction regime rather than
a monetary damages regime may work better to achieve compliance by selectively targeting sanctions
against politically powerful exporters of a violating country. Similarly, the beneficiary will be the
country that brings the claim rather than specific exporters in the aggrieved country. This will reduce
incentive for any exporter to push for sanctions. But see Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The
Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the World Trade Organization 's Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 6
THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. 215, 216-17 (2005) (arguing that a "retaliation" or "negative reciprocity"
model is the optimal enforcement strategy for trade liberalization); Alan 0. Sykes, Public Versus Pri-
vate Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 631-
33 (2005) (questioning these assumptions and arguing instead that lack of monetary remedies can allow
for the political process between countries to reach superior outcomes).
86. Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard": A Positive Analysis of the GA TT "Escape
Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 285 (1991). Not all parties may operate
within a rational choice framework based on complete information. A party may react differently when
it is not sophisticated, an approach explained in the behavioral law and economics literature. See, e.g.,
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The purpose of trade institutions is to reduce information costs and
make commitments more credible. 87 In the trade context, the choice of
binding adjudication is the way to address opportunism by making a credi-
ble commitment that each side must follow. 88 A binding third-party en-
forcer reduces the reluctance of parties to agree participate in a contract or
trade agreement. 89 The role of an adjudicator could be to determine the
outcome to which the parties would have agreed had they explicitly pro-
vided for the situation-thereby reducing the transaction costs based on
uncertainty. 90 Under this conceptualization, a trade agreement's effective-
ness is a function of how it can reduce transaction costs and increase trade
liberalization and investment.91
One area in which contracts and trade agreements both rely upon simi-
lar mechanisms is in adjudication in situations of breach. In cases of
breach, a party to the agreement may bring a claim of breach to third-party
adjudication. 92 Dispute resolution may serve as a clearing-house of infor-
mation.93 When countries bring a case, dispute resolution serves to monitor
potential violations. It then sorts through disputes between those that are
valid and invalid, the better to use bilateral reputational mechanisms to
create enforcement.94 Agreements that involve more than two countries can
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality As-
sumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1070-83 (2000).
87. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY 214 (1984).
88. Like contracts, trade agreements are incomplete. Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The
Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S179, S184 (2002) ("[T]he parties to trade agreements, like the parties to private con-
tracts, enter the bargain under conditions of uncertainty."); see also Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger,
Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions, 116 Q.J. ECON. 519
(2001); Henrik Horn, National Treatment in the GATT, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 394 (2006).
89. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 332 (1996).
90. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON.
425, 427 (1993) (noting that adjudicators provide "the rules the parties themselves would have chosen
in a transaction-cost-free world").
91. CHRISTINA L. DAVIS, FOOD FIGHTS OVER FREE TRADE: HOW INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
PROMOTE AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION 26 (2003).
92. Most cases will not reach adjudication and will be settled in the shadow of the law. See Robert
Cooter & Stephen Marks with Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable
Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 228-29 (1982); Stewart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 63 (1963); Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE
L.J. 950, 950, 956 (1979).
93. Adjudication also may have information finding and self-enforcement purposes, rather than
simply coercing compliance. Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agree-
ments and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 551, 592. When international adjudication is the
function of confidential dispute settlement, there are limitations to the clearing-house function.
94. Dan Kovenock & Marie Thursby, GA TT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation, 4 ECON. &
POL. 151 (1992). See generally Dan Kovenock & Marie Thursby, GA TT Dispute Settlement and Coop-
eration: A Reply, 9 ECON. & POL. 95 (1997).
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use dispute settlement to verify violations and inform third countries. 95 By
making findings, a trade panel provides for a declaration of whether or not
a party has followed through on its commitments. A trade panel cannot
force behavior. Rather, it is up to the country in violation to comply.
Dispute resolution in trade agreements creates a mechanism to facili-
tate compliance with such agreements. In the WTO context, one recent
article analyzed data from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and WTO disputes between 1973 and 1998 and determined that
possible retaliation has a strong influence on the credibility of the defen-
dant country's commitment to liberalize. 96 The purpose of binding regula-
tory commitments is to make credible commitments for foreign investors.97
The reason that parties commit to binding contractual commitments inter-
nationally can be classified based on four factors: where the probability of
shirking a commitment is high, where there are significant information
costs due to the cost of detection, where the agreement creates a coalition
of like-minded countries, and where a country's executive branch uses the
agreement to commit other branches of government. 98 These rationales at
the WTO level have direct impact for PTA competition policy chapters.
However, the use of PTAs comes with certain adjudication costs.
Complaints are, for the most part, limited to those between states.99 This
feature enables governments to act as gatekeepers to bringing a case. A
private party must first convince its government to bring a claim on its
behalf. To bring a claim, a country must be willing to expend political and
financial capital. It needs to have a sense that it has an above-average
chance of winning such a case, and that by bringing that case, it will not
harm itself in the future with any precedent that it sets. Because of the
power dynamics of PTAs, the costs of adjudicating potential claims benefit
developed world countries and developed world business interests.
95. Giovanni Maggi, The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation, 89
AM. ECON. REv. 190, 191 (1999). However, verification of contracts may have significant costs. See
Robert M. Townsend, Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification, 21 J.
ECON. THEORY 265,266 (1979).
96. See Chad P. Brown, On the Economic Success of GA TT/WTO Dispute Settlement, 86 REv.
ECON. & STAT. 811, 812-13 (2004). This may not be the same in other areas of economic law, such as
investment arbitration confidentiality.
97. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541, 549 (2003) ("[C]ommercial parties' first-order preference [is] to have the state enforce
contracts in order to protect relation-specific investments and to guard against especially disruptive
market movements."). There may be limits to the information-finding function in situations in which
agreements allow for arbitrational awards that are not made public to non-parties.
98. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,
54 INT'L ORG. 421, 429-30 (2000).
99. Exceptions would be agreements like NAFTA, which allow for private rights of action.
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C. Data Set
Previous academic work has examined competition policy PTAs. One
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) paper
reviews the competition policy provisions in forty-seven trade agreements.
Most of those agreements studied were from the period 2001-2004. The
OECD paper categorizes them across eight different variables. 100 Another
OECD study undertakes a qualitative assessment of competition policy
provisions of PTAs.1 01 Similarly, the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) has produced a qualitative study of the pro-
visions within PTA competition policy chapters.102
The present article is both an extension of and a departure from the
previous literature on PTA competition policy chapters, and focuses spe-
cifically on Latin American PTAs. Unlike previous work, the present arti-
cle examines all Latin American PTAs to gauge how competition policy
chapters have been crafted, and what provisions they include for an entire
region during the period of the PTA "explosion." It extends previous works
by expanding the population of agreements to include all agreements with a
competition policy chapter in which at least one Latin American country is
a party. It also includes all Latin American PTAs in which there is no com-
petition policy chapter, and considers a number of additional provisions
and other classifications to be coded. For the purposes of this article, Latin
America includes all western hemisphere countries south of the U.S., in-
cluding the Caribbean.
Previous scholarship by others contained a number of incorrect desig-
nations for some of the Latin American PTAs (in cases where such PTAs
were included in their analysis). I have therefore recoded these studies to
reflect accurate designations. Further, in coding the provisions, I have lim-
ited my analysis to those agreements that have specific competition policy
chapters, rather than including provisions in other chapters that have com-
petition impacts. This affected the coding of the previous OECD analysis.
One could include all provisions that implicate competition policy in trade
100. See Oliver Solano & Andreas Sennekamp, Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agree-
ments 7-9 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD] Joint Group on Trade and Competition,
OECD Trade Policy Working Paper Series, Paper No. 31, 2006), available at http://webdominol.oecd.
org/olis/2005doc.nsf/Linkto/com-daf-td(2005)3-final.
101. See generally OECD, The Relationship Between Regional Trade Agreements and the Multilat-
eral Trading System: Competition, OECD Doc. TD/TC/WP(2002) 19/FINAL (May 7, 2002) (prepared
by Hunter Nottage).
102. See generally The UNCTAD Secretariat, A Presentation of Types of Common Provisions to be
Found in International, Particularly Bilateral and Regional, Cooperation Agreements on Competition
Policy and their Application, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF.6/3 (Sept. 6, 2005).
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agreements. However, such inclusion would implicate much of any trade
agreement, because much of trade is about increasing competition and the
competitive process. For example, at the WTO level, almost sixty provi-
sions address competition-reiated issues. 103 As one of the leading scholars
on international trade, John Jackson, summarizes, "In short, as to competi-
tion policy being dealt with by the WTO Agreements, there is already a
substantial position for the WTO (those who resist are too late!)."'1 04 Simi-
larly, at the PTA level, many provisions address competition issues that are
more broadly defined, such as services, intellectual property, telecommuni-
cations, and subsidies.
This article is a departure from previous work examining PTAs in
competition policy. It examines twenty-four agreements with competition
policy chapters that have been signed by the parties, and includes those
agreements that have been signed but have not yet entered into effect from
the period 1992-2006.105 The PTAs include both North-South and South-
South agreements. 106 Of the twenty-four agreements with competition pol-
icy chapters, fifteen are North-South agreements. Of the twelve agreements
that lack competition policy chapters, four are North-South agreements.
The source for data on the PTAs is the Organization of American States
(OAS) trade database. 107 The total number of agreements is too small for
quantitative analysis, as changes to only a few agreements could signifi-
cantly alter the total outcome. To provide a contrast with those agreements
with competition policy chapters, this article provides additional insights
by examining the twelve Latin American PTAs without competition policy
chapters. Together, these thirty-six agreements comprise the entire popula-
tion of Latin American PTAs since the inclusion of the first competition
policy chapter of a PTA in NAFTA. None of the previous studies focus
upon the key finding of any analysis of these provisions-the lack of bind-
ing dispute settlement for substantive provisions. This finding is in sharp
contrast to empirical work on the use of dispute settlement in international
103. John H. Jackson, Afterword: The Linkage Problem-Comments on Five Texts, 96 AM. J. INT'L
L. 118, 124 (2002).
104. Id.
105. The basis for the start date is the year in which NAFTA entered into effect. North American
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). NAFTA was the first
Latin American PTA to include a competition policy chapter. However, the regional integration agree-
ments of CARICOM and the Andean Community (which are beyond the scope of study of this article)
had competition policy chapters though neither functioned particularly well.
106. 1 define a country as a "northern" country if it is a member of the OECD. This includes coun-
tries such as Mexico and Korea.
107. OAS, SICE: Trade Agreements, http://www.sice.oas.org/agreements-e.asp (last visited Oct.
31, 2007). Interestingly, among the regional and international organizations, OAS lacks a focus on
antitrust.
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agreements. Generally, the more complex a problem, the more likely it is
that an agreement covering it will include dispute settlement. 108 In a depar-
ture from the previous literature, the current article discusses why these
chapters exist at all, given the lack of dispute settlement.
Competition policy chapters have been coded across twenty-four types
in which at least one competition policy chapter has such provisions. All
results are based on bimodal variables. The taxonomy of provisions appears
in Appendix I to this article. Provisions that appear in three-quarters or
more of PTAs include those describing competition laws at the time of the
agreement; those to adopt, maintain, and apply competition measures; and
those of general cooperation. Provisions that appear in more than half but
fewer than three-quarters of all agreements include those concerning notifi-
cation, evidence and information exchange, consultations, state enterprises
or state monopolies, and non-discrimination. Provisions that appear in
greater than one-fourth but fewer than half of all agreements include anti-
competitive agreements and those concerning abuse of dominance or mo-
nopolization, trade consultations, and binding dispute settlement.
Provisions that appear in less than a quarter of all agreements include those
discussing negative comity, positive comity, state aid and subsidies, merg-
ers, non-discrimination for state enterprises or state monopolies, due proc-
ess, transparency, elimination of anti-dumping, dispute settlement for
substantive antitrust issues, technical assistance and capacity building, and
antitrust immunities.
This article's most important finding is that the number of agreements
that have dispute settlement, particularly for "pure" antitrust related provi-
sions, is non-existent. 109 For example, the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA), building upon a similar NAFTA provision, includes language
that "[n]othing in this Chapter shall be construed to infringe each Party's
autonomy in developing its competition policies or in deciding how to en-
force its competition laws."' 10 Binding dispute settlement does not cover
those actions that an antitrust agency could enforce on its own. This fore-
108. Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution
Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 189, 209 (2007).
109. Indeed, the only agreement that has the possibility of dispute resolution, that between Mexico
and Israel, has a high threshold of there being no domestic recourse. Decreto promulgatorio del Tratado
de Libre Comercio entre los Estados Unidos Mexicanos el Estado de Israel, Mex.-Isr., Apr. 10, 2000,
Diario Oficial de la Federacirn [D.O.] 28 de Junio de 2000 (Mex.), available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/meis e/isr-mexind e.asp. For cartels, monopolization and mergers to
ever meet this threshold is virtually impossible since this is the primary work of any antitrust agency
and of antitrust law.
I10. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 16.1, June 6, 2003, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
TradeAgreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/FinalTexts/Section-index.html.
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closes cases from PTA adjudication, in which an agency can exercise
prosecutorial discretion. In effect, the lack of dispute settlement has created
soft law within the guise of a hard law agreement. This is the institutional
choice of a preference of domestic antitrust, working in concert with soft
law organizations-primarily antitrust agencies-over international trade
law agreements and international adjudication. This result is explored in
more detail in section II(D)(3) below.
Next, in order to contrast competition policy chapters, this article
compares Latin American PTAs agreements with competition policy chap-
ters to those without them. While there are twenty-four total agreements
that contain competition policy chapters, twelve lack such chapters. The
lack of competition policy chapters in these agreements occurs throughout
the timeline of the PTA explosion (1992 to the present). The most likely
determining factor for whether or not such chapters are included in the
PTAs seems to be whether or not all parties had antitrust laws at the time
they signed the agreement. This pattern occurred in eight of the eleven
agreements. When combined with the agreements that contained competi-
tion policy chapters, only six out of thirty-three agreements in which all
parties had antitrust laws at the time of agreement lacked competition pol-
icy chapters.
Solely examining competition policy chapters overlooks other possi-
ble explanations for the inclusion of such chapters or for particular types of
provisions. Too much faith may be put into the words of the contract as an
explanation for the underlying situation that requires contractual dealings.
Perhaps the assumption is that most problems can be solved ex ante, so that
dispute settlement will not be needed. To provide a comparison to the find-
ings related to competition policy, I test this hypothesis with an examina-
tion of other chapters in the PTAs. I compare all thirty-six Latin America
PTAs (both including and excluding competition policy chapters) and
compare the findings against two other types of chapters found in the same
PTAs. The other chapters examined for comparative purposes are services
and intellectual property (IP). Both of these chapters have competition-like
rationales.I 1 Both address issues of non-discrimination in domestic regula-
tion. In many cases, both also address issues of anticompetitive practices,
such as monopolization in IP licensing or in the provision of services. If
competition policy chapters are like other regulatory chapters in PTAs, it
11. Other chapters could be explored as well. I exclude investments because in addition to trade
agreements, investment protection may be covered under bilateral investment treaties, thereby adding to
the complexity of the comparative analysis.
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would follow that the other regulatory chapters should also lack dispute
settlement.
In terms of coverage, of the thirty-six agreements, only three lack dis-
pute settlement in IP, and none lack dispute settlement in services. In
twelve of the agreements, there are no IP chapters, whereas only four of the
thirty-six agreements did not include service chapters. Thus, competition
policy seems to be treated differently than other areas of domestic regula-
tion, even those that have competition-like provisions. One critical differ-
ence between competition policy and these other areas is that the WTO
covers these other issues under the General Agreement for Trade in Ser-
vices and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights.1 12 Thus, even if a PTA does not cover IP and services, there is the
backstop of WTO-level commitments and dispute resolution in both of
these areas. As such, the lack of dispute resolution or even a stand-alone
chapter in a PTA does not mean there is no recourse for these issues at the
international level. Rather, lack of inclusion of coverage in PTAs for these
issues suggests no additional coverage beyond that already offered by the
WTO. The WTO therefore serves as a "floor" for coverage: a PTA may
include more coverage in these provisions, but cannot reduce it below what
countries have agreed to in the WTO. Without any direct competition pol-
icy provisions in the WTO agreements, there is no similar floor guarantee-
ing that an international recourse in antitrust will be pursued for a violation
of PTA provisions.
D. Analysis
1. The Basis for Including Competition Policy Chapters
The first question that negotiators consider is whether or not to include
competition policy as a chapter in the proposed PTA. 113 There has not been
a consistent response to this by parties to PTAs. The dataset assembled
demonstrates that not all Latin American PTAs have competition policy
chapters. This is the case even for countries that have competition policy
chapters in some agreements but not others (including some countries that
112. General Agreement on Trade in Services annex 1B, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1167; Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights annex IC, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1197.
113. To aid in the analysis of competition policy chapters, I have discussed these chapters and their
meanings with former and current antitrust and trade officials in over half of the countries that have
signed PTAs. The rationale provided for such agreements varies across those discussions, such that no
single explanation on its own provides sufficient rationalization for why these agreements exist as they
do.
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had them in earlier agreements but not later ones, and vice versa). The de-
cision to include such a chapter may come down to the priorities and de-
sires of potential signatories and how these desires play out within a larger
political economy context in trade negotiations. Discussions with trade and
antitrust negotiators involved in a number of these PTAs support a more ad
hoc, situational explanation to the inclusion of competition policy chapters.
Trade negotiators may have different objectives than competition
agencies. The initial template of potential commitments in competition
policy chapters may be different depending on whether trade or competi-
tion negotiators take the lead in drafting these provisions. Provisions in-
cluded within PTAs may be more or less effective depending on whether or
not there is antitrust agency support for these commitments. Pressure may
exist to reach an agreement among trade negotiators. The inclusion of pro-
visions that may create contention in what is a second order chapter (as
opposed to first order chapters such as market access, agriculture, or ser-
vices) may not be a priority for the trade negotiators. This may explain the
form that certain agreements take. It may also implicate the decision not to
include these chapters in certain agreements. The overall trade deal embod-
ied in a PTA must appeal to a number of different domestic constituencies.
These constituencies may be more willing to trade off antitrust for other
areas specifically of interest to them within a PTA. As antitrust agencies do
not supervise the overall trade negotiation, but merely the antitrust discus-
sions, the relatively small role that many antitrust agencies play in overall
trade discussions supports a more eclectic outcome as to which agreements
may include competition policy chapters.
The decision to include a competition policy chapter is not merely one
of power relationships. If power dynamics were the primary explanation for
the inclusion of a competition policy chapter, all U.S. agreements would
include (or lack) such chapters, as the United States holds asymmetric bar-
gaining power in its trade agreements, especially on issues in which the
other country does not have concentrated interests. Instead, a substantial
number of U.S. PTAs lack such provisions (Thailand, Israel, CAFTA-DR,
Bahrain, Morocco, and Jordan). If the United States thought that competi-
tion policy was a priority within the trade context, it would push for these
chapters in all the agreements; if competition policy was not a priority, the
U.S. would then not include them in any of the agreements. Given the hos-
tility of United States antitrust agencies to a binding WTO competition
policy framework, there may be other factors at play that would allow the
U.S. to include competition policy chapters in some of its PTAs. The
United States position may be best described as one that does not oppose
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competition policy chapters so long as the chapters remain non-binding and
the PTA counter-party finds the inclusion of such a chapter to be impor-
tant. 114
Other countries may have a number of reasons to include competition
policy chapters. The inclusion of competition policy chapters may create
opportunities for direct contact between antitrust agency staff counterparts,
and to develop personal and institutional ties. When antitrust agencies par-
ticipate in the trade negotiations, there may be an increased buy-in for the
provisions of a competition policy chapter by the antitrust agencies. It may
offer a roadmap of what issues young antitrust agencies might want to em-
phasize for existing or perceived future needs. This tailoring may ensure
that the chapter will be responsive to the concerns of the agency and local-
ize the chapter within a country's political economy situation so that im-
plementation even without dispute settlement may be possible.
2. Do competition policy chapters create compliance?
a. Creating Compliance
A critical question to the analysis of provisions within PTAs is the
larger question of whether or not a PTA generally, and a competition policy
chapter specifically, creates compliance. The effectiveness of each institu-
tion must be based on its ability to obtain credible commitments from
countries.1 5 Credible international commitments in turn create domestic
compliance. Scholarship supports the claim that PTAs work as a commit-
ment mechanism in their implementation.' 16 Trade openness affects the
political balance of interest groups in a country. Competition from in-
creased imports mobilizes local firms to push for regulatory change in bot-
tlenecks in the economy that affect all businesses, such as
telecommunications, electricity, or financial institutions. Competition also
increases the power of exporters and of industries that benefit from foreign
inputs of production. In a given country, over time interests that support
existing trade agreements increase significantly. 1 7 The binding effect of
114. The EU's position on competition policy chapters seems to have been to mirror EU attempts
to include competition policy at the WTO for non-binding core issues of increased transparency, non-
discrimination, procedural fairness, voluntary cooperation, capacity building, and cartels. See lgnacio
Garcia Bercero & Stefan D. Amarasinha, Moving the Trade and Competition Debate Forward, 4 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 481,485-87 (2001).
115. See Daron Acemoglu, Why Not a Political Coase Theorem?: Social Conflict, Commitment,
and Politics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 620 (2003).
116. See WORLD BANK, supra note 27, at xi.
117. Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 88, at S195.
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trade agreements may create domestic compliance with them. As interest
groups benefit from trade agreements, affected groups create political pres-
sure for compliance. This in turn may provide for increased domestic re-
form based on international commitments.
There are reputational effects for parties that do not comply. Lack of
compliance in one area may make other countries less likely to enter into
future agreements with a non-compliant country.' 1 8 The general perception
of adjudication is that it creates compliance merely because of the threat of
potential use. Weiler argues that "when governments are pulled into court
and required to explain, justify, and defend their decision, they are in a
forum where diplomatic license is far more restricted, where good faith is a
presumptive principle, and where states are meant to live by their state-
ments." 119 The more legitimate an international adjudicator, the greater the
reputational cost of non-compliance. The opportunity to bring a case does
not mean that many cases will actually be brought. Indeed, most violations
of trade agreements, whether PTAs or the WTO agreement itself, do not
result in cases being brought. However, many countries settle their dis-
agreements in the shadow if the law. Outside of this formal legal process,
countries can engage in state-to-state bargaining to overcome disputes.
Non-binding agreements make state-to-state bargaining (or agency-to-
agency bargaining) the only way to settle such disputes, though there may
be reputational effects for non-compliance in this area as well.
Compliance is more likely where there is the intent and capacity to
comply. 120 This holds for PTAs generally, assuming that there are credible
commitments based on binding adjudication. The case of antitrust is differ-
ent in that the lack of credible commitments for implementation would not
necessarily lead to such results. A second difference is that unlike issues
such as IP, services, or telecommunications, antitrust lacks specific cover-
age at the WTO that provides dispute settlement. Because there are no
minimum international obligations in antitrust, countries may be less will-
118. See Guzman, supra note 82, at 604 ("[T]he parties must balance a desire to include the effi-
cient terms against a desire to avoid the consequences of a violation. This may lead them to enter into
an agreement with weaker substantive terms."). Theoretically this may be true. Empirical work on
WTO commitments and compliance suggests that this may not hold generally in the international trade
realm in practice. See Andrew K. Rose, Does the WTO Make Trade More Stable?, 16 OPEN ECON. REV.
7, 18 (2005); Andrew K. Rose, Do We Really Know That The WTO Increases Trade?, 94 AM. ECON.
REV. 98, 98 (2004); Andrew K. Rose, Do WTO Members Have More Liberal Trade Policy?, 63 J. INT'L
ECON. 209, 209-10 (2004).
119. J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors, 26
COMP. POL. STUD. 510, 519 (1994).
120. Edith Brown Weiss, Conclusions: Understanding Compliance with Soft Law, in COMMITMENT
AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 543
(Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
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ing to give up sovereignty in this area, as they have not done so previ-
ously. 121
b. Shaping Norms and Norm Diffusion
A PTA's competition policy chapter may encourage compliance
through norm creation. International organizations serve as "conveyer belts
for the transmission of norms and models of 'good' political behavior."' 122
These norms help to facilitate domestic compliance. Norm creation works
through the construction and acceptance of social conventions. As an en-
forcement mechanism, norms may operate as alternative to formal law as a
means of social control. 123 A norm-based system may be preferred if it
lowers enforcement costs below that of formal dispute resolution through
adjudication. 124 In other situations, norms may work in conjunction with
formal law. Law may serve the function of establishing or altering an exist-
ing norm. 125 This occurs as law alters the social meaning of behavior.126
Antitrust norm creation requires effective leadership for the norm to
become accepted across countries. Countries with greater power will want
the international standard to move closer to their domestic laws, in order to
reduce the transition costs to the new system. Harmonization of regulatory
systems may come about because great powers can coerce others to adopt
their policy preferences. 127 Similarly, when a single market is large
enough, a state can use its power to change the regulatory policy prefer-
ences of other states. 128 Because of power dynamics, the United States and
the EU are able to alter the preferences of other states towards their own
policy preferences, assuming that the two have similar preferences. 129 As
121. Florian Becker, The Case of Export Cartel Exemptions: Between Competition and Protection-
ism, 3 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 97, 100 (2007).
122. Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of Interna-
tional Organizations, 53 INT'L ORG. 699, 712-13 (1999).
123. See Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 672-75 (1986).
124. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1795, 1820-21 (1996).
125. Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 564-65 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, On
the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024-25 (1996).
126. In one such example, Lawrence Lessig argues that by formalizing through law a prohibition
on dueling, the norm of dueling changed from defending one's honor and towards legal compliance.
Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181, 2186-87 (1996).
127. See generally Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of
Capital Market Regulation, 55 INT'L ORG. 589, 591 (2001).
128. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY 5-6 (1995).
129. See Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization, Harmonization, and Competition: The Different Path-
ways to Policy Convergence, 12 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 841, 843-46 (2005). On great powers framing
norms and institutions, see generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY
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theory would suggest, the great powers (the U.S. and the EU) have framed
the norms and institutional choices in international antitrust, including in
PTAs, to reflect their interests.
As younger antitrust agencies interact more with established agencies,
a form of regulatory export occurs. 130 Under regulatory export, younger
agencies adopt the norms of more established and powerful agencies. This
leads to increased policy convergence, primarily along a developed world
model. Yet, the ability to reach increased implementation of shared anti-
trust norms does not suggest that harmonization means regulatory confor-
mity in approach and implementation. 131 Differences in what constitutes,
for example, monopolization outweigh similarities across jurisdictions. 132
Regulatory power is asymmetric in this area, but not so much so that one
country can dictate the regulatory system of other countries. 133 PTAs may
be a way for the United States and the EU to shape the nature of antitrust
harmonization and norm diffusion across countries through the regulatory
export of certain ideas and enforcement priorities, as embodied in PTA
competition policy chapter provisions.
3. Explanations for the Lack of Dispute Settlement
The empirical study's most interesting finding is that competition pol-
icy chapters lack dispute settlement, while other similar chapters have
them. Why create an agreement that lacks a way to punish shirking? How
do we explain the lack of dispute settlement in competition policy chapters
where countries enter into an agreement or formal contract? Finally, why is
antitrust different from other areas of regulation in a trade context?134 In
effect, the lack of dispute settlement is a choice for continued domestic
(1999); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1113, 1174-75 (1999).
130. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Net-
works and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (2002).
131. Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Competition or Regulatory Harmonization? A Silly Question?, 3 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 257, 262-63 (2000).
132. See Michal S. Gal, Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offense in the U.S. and the EC: Two
Systems of Belief About Monopoly?, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 343, 344-46 (2004); Keith N. Hylton, Sec-
tion 2 and Article 82: A Comparison ofAmerican and European Approaches to Monopolization Law I -
2, 7-9 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper Series, Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 06-11,
2006), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/abstracts/2006/pdf
files/HyltonK051606.pdf.
133. See LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD: POWER POLITICS AND THE RISE OF
SUPRANATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 6-9 (2000).
134. There must be an explanation of the nature of this organizational arrangement. This is, after
all, the basis of the inquiry of New Institutional Economics. NORTH, supra note 14, at 89; WILLIAMSON,
supra note 2; Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. So 739, 772-73
(1984).
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antitrust enforcement with soft law organizations assisting to improve do-
mestic capacity and reduce transaction costs across jurisdictions over the
traditional binding adjudication of trade law.
a. Antitrust is substantively different from other areas of law.
Antitrust may be different from other substantive regulatory fields.
The transaction costs for dispute settlement in antitrust may be higher than
in IP, services, or regulatory areas. A violation in IP may be an issue of the
level of enforcement. It may be easier to detect non-enforcement in IP
(such as the extent of counterfeit goods) than in antitrust, where the viola-
tion of a provision against monopolization may be more difficult to detect
or prove.135 One limit to this explanation is that certain areas covered under
both IP and services provisions, such as monopolistic practices of services
or anticompetitive licensing practices in intellectual property, have anti-
trust-like problems of detection.
There may be different ways of viewing antitrust enforcement and the
competitive process, as opposed to the enforcement of IP or services, which
may have greater international norms (as established through the WTO). In
contrast to IP and services, there are no binding international antitrust
agreements that would allow for adjudication in a trade context. 136 There
may be strong explanatory power for substantive disagreements in antitrust
preventing the inclusion of dispute settlement. On a number of antitrust
issues, there is significant disagreement between countries, including be-
tween the United States and the European Union and Latin American coun-
tries; these disagreements for the most part fall within a continuum between
U.S. and EU frameworks. The lack of substantive convergence in some
areas of antitrust across jurisdictions (particularly but not exclusively in the
area of monopolization) may suggest high costs for a binding commitment.
This concern addresses how the United States, the EU, and others approach
antitrust law issues.
The U.S. approach is more minimalist in its interventions. Its default
presumption is that the market works effectively. This presumption limits
the need for possible regulatory intervention. 137 The effect of this approach
135. See Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 693, 713-
15 (2000).
136. But see loannis Lianos, The Contribution of the United Nations to the Emergence of Global
Antitrust Law, 15 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 415, 415, 418, 455 (2007) (arguing that UNCTAD has
helped to set up some customary international antitrust norms).
137. Eleanor M. Fox, What Is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive
Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 372 (2002). Richard Posner expresses this viewpoint in the context of
U.S. antitrust in the preface to RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at viii (2d ed. 2001) ("Much of
antitrust law in 1976 was an intellectual disgrace. Today, antitrust law is a body of economically ra-
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is that it yields fewer "false positives" of errant enforcement than other
enforcement approaches. In particular, this view is suspicious of the claims
of anticompetitive effects of monopolization cases or vertical restraints.
The EU approach takes a broader view of the meaning of efficiency and
anticompetitive harm. This approach requires greater justification for firms
to undertake exclusionary conduct. 138 This view is also more suspicious of
dominance and vertical restraints, and under this view thresholds on domi-
nant behavior tend to be lower. 139
In particular, monopolization and vertical restraints generally are sig-
nificant points of disagreement between U.S. and EU approaches to anti-
trust. 140 These differences have an important impact in debates on the
appropriate role for competition policy in its interface with international
trade. Vertical restraints implicate market access concerns that are at the
heart of international trade law.141 The differences between antitrust no-
tions of barriers to entry and how they interface with trade's regime of non-
discrimination for market access was a leading area of contention in the
WTO debates on the inclusion of competition policy at the global level
tional principles largely though not entirely congruent with the principles set forth in the first edition.
The chief worry at present is not doctrine or direction, but implementation."). Economists debate
whether there should be a consumer welfare or total welfare standard to promote greater economic
efficiency. Within the EU, the standard is consumer welfare. ROBERT O'DONOGHUE & A. JORGE
PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 82 EC, at 4 (2006). The U.S. also bases its standard
on consumer welfare. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). There is some debate as to
whether or not consumer welfare really refers to consumer welfare or total welfare. See Merger En-
forcement, Panel II Treatment for Efficiencies in Merger Enforcement: Statement for the Hearing of
the Antitrust Modernization Comm 'n 1 (2005) (statement of Charles F. Rule, Former Assistant Att'y
Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 1986-1989), available at http://www.amc.gov/
commissionhearings/pdf/Statement-Rule.pdf.
138. See Fox, supra note 137, at 373.
139. See Gunnar Niels & Adriaan ten Kate, Introduction: Antitrust in the U.S. and the EU-
Converging or Diverging Paths?, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 12-15 (2004).
140. See Robert W. Hahn, Introduction to ANTITRUST POLICY AND VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 1-6
(Robert W. Hahn ed., 2006). See generally OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, VERTICAL AGREEMENTS:
UNDERSTANDING COMPETITION LAW 2-3 (2004), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice and_
resources/publications/guidance/competition-act/oft419; James C. Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Daniel P.
O'Brien & Michael G_ Vita, A Comparative Study of United States and European Union Approaches to
Vertical Policy, 13 GEO. MASON L. REv. 289, 289-90 (200); Ekaterina Rousseva, Modernizing by
Eradicating: How the Commission's New Approach to Article 81 EC Dispenses with the Need to Apply
Article 82 EC to Vertical Restraints, 42 COMMON MARKET L. REv. 587 (2005); Toshiaki Takigawa, A
Comparative Analysis of U.S., EU, and Japanese Microsoft Cases: How to Regulate Exclusionary
Conduct by a Dominant Firm in a Network Industry, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 237, 248-51 (2005); and
sources cited supra note 132.
141. See KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 29-30 (2002).
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within a trade regime. 142 These fundamental disagreements may be the
reason for the lack of binding provisions in Latin American PTAs.
Who decides potential disputes under PTAs may explain the lack of
binding dispute resolution or even binding consultations within competition
policy chapters. Because trade panels and trade lawyers participate in PTA
adjudication, antitrust agencies may be reluctant to let trade experts weigh
in on antitrust matters. Trade experts may have a different substantive ap-
proach based on their anti-dumping experience ("unfair" competition) and
different goals based on market access and non-discrimination concerns. In
either case, trade experts may focus more on producer welfare rather than
efficiency concerns. 143 Put differently, antitrust and international trade have
overlapping but distinct concerns. Antitrust looks at competitive effects,
whereas trade examines whether there has been discriminatory regulation.
b. Antitrust agency cooperation has similarities to relational contracting.
There may be no need for formal adjudication when there is a strong
relationship between parties. The inclusion of non-binding provisions may
have the purpose of facilitating enforcement outside of formal contracting.
Formal contracting will not be needed when more informal mechanisms are
adequate to provide sanctions against non-compliant behavior. 144 From an
antitrust agency perspective, cross-border antitrust disputes may be better
resolved through bilateral discussions at the inter-agency level than through
a trade remedy. In such a setting, agencies that speak a similar economic
language of efficiency and have similar policy worldviews as to enforce-
ment may be better able to make progress over disputes than a mix of trade
and antitrust officials with different approaches and goals.
The negotiations of competition policy chapters may add to the crea-
tion of rituals of behavior for increased cooperation among antitrust en-
forcers. 145 Formal contracts with adjudication for disputes may not be
necessary when the purpose of the contract is to create repeat interactions
among those parties bound by the contract.14 6 Having a competition policy
chapter in a PTA may make antitrust agency officials more likely to inter-
142. See generally MARSDEN, supra note 68, at 45-64 (discussing the history of competition policy
in international trade commitments and the WTO Working Group debates on the interaction between
trade and competition policy).
143. Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INT'L L.
478, 483 (2000).
144. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOc.
REV. 55, 63 (1963).
145. See generally Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 91
(2003).
146. Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465, 467.
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act because the chapter creates legitimacy for the ritual of interaction.
Merely having antitrust enforcers meet on a regular basis may be a way to
increase institutional ties, improve cooperation and coordination between
the parties, and resolve potential disputes. Frequent interactions may make
it easier to communicate on a regular basis via phone or the internet, and to
spend time together to discuss issues while at conferences. Most problems
can be solved in this way. The daily antitrust problems that agencies will
need greater cooperation on are ones of coordination, such as mergers and
cartels. 147
Reputational effects and social pressure may create credible commit-
ments that do not require formal contracting. 148 In these situations, rela-
tional contracting may be preferred because reputation comes at a lower
cost than formal adjudication. 149 These situations of private ordering re-
quire trust and repeat players to facilitate such transactions. 150 In a game
theory model, Axelrod uses a classic prisoner's dilemma to articulate that
when there is a repeat game in which the number of repetitions is unknown
and the discount rate is low, the optimal strategy that will result is that of
cooperation. 151 In a departure from the game theory cooperation strategy,
contracts may be required when the contract is the end-game and there is
no intended repeat relationship. A formal contract with adjudication serves
as a backstop only when the relationship sours. 152
c. Soft Law Organizations as the Equivalent of Private Ordering in
Contract Law
Private ordering in the contract realm of transaction cost economics
suggests a similar type of situation within PTAs. Soft law antitrust institu-
tions take the role of informal contracting. The preference for non-binding
chapters may be a preference for soft law. The effect of a choice of soft law
is to create a lower level of commitment based on better practices by agen-
147. See generally Sokol, supra note 54, at 97-116.
148. See Peter H. Huang, International Environmental Law and Emotional Rational Choice, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S237, S239-40 (2002).
149. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 247
(1991); Macaulay, supra note 146, at 62-63.
150. See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM
MEDIEVAL TRADE 8 (2006); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 116 (1992); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the
Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL
STUD. 349, 350 (1981); Paul J. Zak & Stephen Knack, Trust and Growth, 111 ECON. J. 295, 296
(2001).
15 1. This is based on a tit-for-tat game theory strategy, reacting to the previous move of the other
player. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 36-39 (1984).
152. See Bernstein, supra note 150, at 124.
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cies that can change over time, as economic thinking at the domestic anti-
trust agency level changes more easily over time than the alternative-the
competency of international adjudicators to understand complex issues of
economic regulation in competition matters where such interactions are
episodic and repeat interactions of adjudicators in this area are unlikely to
lead to the development of specific knowledge on these issues. Moreover,
the choice of non-binding commitments that favor soft law allows for
greater agency discretion in case selection. A binding international agree-
ment may be necessary if it would be more effective than the domestic or
soft law alternatives. The lack of a binding agreement may suggest trust in
the domestic capacity of antitrust agencies and that domestic reform is
preferable to supra-national adjudication. Soft law can assist in improving
the capacity of domestic antitrust institutions. Overall, soft law organiza-
tions provide an opportunity for cooperation, discussion, norm diffusion
and assistance in domestic antitrust enforcement, capacity building, and
expertise. 153
Latin American countries participate in norm creation and antitrust
soft law through a number of soft law international institutions. Compli-
ance helps to allow norms to take root within an organization (in our case,
domestic antitrust agencies through soft law organizations). 154 The most
important of these soft law institutions are UNCTAD, the International
Competition Network (ICN), the OECD/Inter-American Development
Bank Latin-American Competition Forum, and the Ibero-American Com-
petition Forum (Foro Iberoamericano de Competencia). Though the effec-
tiveness of each of these soft law institutions may be different, all share
important similarities. These organizations hold conferences at the agency
level that discuss enforcement priorities and approaches on topic themes,
and that identify better practices, create personal relationships among en-
forcers, and identify and diffuse antitrust norms based on "better" prac-
tices. 155 Among other work products, the institutions provide background
153. In a private firm context, firms that are able to innovate in their organizational structure and
behavior are the ones that have the best networks to learn about better practices. See generally Lisa M.
Lynch, The Adoption and Diffusion of Organizational Innovation: Evidence for the U.S. Economy
(National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13156, 2007), available at http://www.nber.
org/papers/w1 3156.
154. Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN.
REV. Soc. 479 (1997).
155. Even in soft law there is a reduction in domestic sovereignty. Some advocates of networks
want it both ways. They argue that networks are effective. They also suggest that such effective net-
works do not impact a country's sovereignty. However, by being effective, such networks do cut into
decision-making at the national level as networks push countries to adopt best practices. See Joshua
Cohen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 763, 764 (2005). This is
a form of soft coercion by pushing domestic practices in a new direction. Because of decisions being
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papers, presentations by speakers, reports, analyses and other documents
that expand upon issues discussed at the conferences and workshops. 156
However, there are limits to soft law's effectiveness. The ability of
soft law to improve domestic level antitrust systems does not happen on its
own. Soft law organizations require agency level implementation of its
better practices. Domestic capacity constraints and limitations based on the
effectiveness of each of the soft law organizations suggests that while these
organizations are a net benefit, they still leave significant gaps in terms of
enforcement capacity for Latin American antitrust agencies, particularly on
substantive rather than procedural issues.
UNCTAD has played a role in competition policy since the 1970s. In
this early period, UNCTAD created a non-binding set of principles on
competition policy in 1980. This set was the first modem attempt to pro-
vide structure to competition policy around the world.157 Since the promul-
gation of the UNCTAD principles, UNCTAD has been active in Latin
America, providing technical assistance to antitrust authorities in both the
drafting and implementation of competition laws. It also hosts conferences
of antitrust agencies. Recent Latin American efforts involve the implemen-
tation of competition-related provisions in FTAs and the COMPAL project
for Latin American countries to improve capacity building through techni-
cal assistance and inter-agency exchanges. 158
For many years, UNCTAD had been the only soft law organization for
Latin American-wide antitrust discussions. This changed starting in 2001,
when a number of other organizations were established. These new organi-
zations allowed Latin American antitrust agencies to participate in regional
or global antitrust discussions that had greater involvement from the senior
officials of developed world antitrust agencies. Though the OECD Compe-
tition Law and Policy Committee (CLPC) limits its membership to OECD
made in international organizations, "the decisions of domestic administrators are increasingly con-
strained by substantive and procedural norms established at the global level." Benedict Kingsbury, Nico
Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 15, 26 (2005). Legislatures remain uninvolved in this process. Strong results and positive
outcomes facilitated by the institutional choice of soft law antitrust organizations may outweigh con-
cerns about a democracy deficit. Increased harmonization may be likely over time when the social
benefits outweigh the costs. See also Julie Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S61, S62-64 (2002).
156. See Sokol, supra note 54, at 69, 97-116.
157. See generally UNCTAD, The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for
the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF/10/REV.2 (2000). Earlier
efforts go back to the League of Nations and the Havana Charter. See Sokol, supra note 54, at 44-45.
158. See generally UNCTAD, Implementing Competition-Related Provisions in Regional Trade
Agreements: Is it Possible to Obtain Development Gains?, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2006/4
(2007) (prepared by Ana Maria Alvarez & Laurence Wilse-Samson), available at http://www.unctad.
org/en/docs/ditcclp20064-en.pdf.
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members, 159 since 2002 the OECD has hosted an annual Latin American
Competition Forum in conjunction with the Inter-American Development
Bank. This annual meeting is similar to CLPC meetings, except that the
topics addressed speak to the Latin American development experience.
Recent conferences have focused on issues such as interactions between
antitrust and sector regulators, cartels, competition advocacy, and mergers.
The Ibero-American Competition Forum is a trans-Atlantic initiative on
competition policy spearheaded by the Latin countries of the European
Union, the Portuguese Autoridade da Concorrrncia and the Spanish Tribu-
nal de Defensa de la Competencia, with the Spanish- and Portuguese-
speaking countries of Latin America. Since 2002, Ibero-American Compe-
tition Forum holds an annual meeting of agency heads and other senior
officials to discuss trends in antitrust and enforcement strategies as part of
discussions of case studies on issues such as abuse of dominance and
mergers. It also holds an annual Ibero-American School for Competition
Defense to improve agency level capacities.
The ICN is a global forum of antitrust agencies and non-governmental
advisors founded in 2001. It has significant developing world participation.
In addition to conferences and workshops, it prepares training manuals and
templates to assist in the implementation of antitrust better practices. A
number of Latin American countries have been active in ICN leadership.
Mexico's agency chief is the former head of the ICN, and Mexico remains
a member of the ICN steering committee. Mexico, Brazil, Jamaica, and
Chile head a number of subgroups within various working groups such as
cartels and competition policy implementation. ICN work has focused on
mergers, cartels, competition policy implementation, sector regulation, and
unilateral conduct. Thus far, the ICN has had success in shaping and im-
plementing antitrust norms in mergers and cartels.
In some circumstances, such as in the day-to-day increase in coopera-
tion, norm creation, and learning, it is difficult to quantify how much soft
law organizations have aided norm diffusion to Latin American agencies.
Moreover, it may be difficult to resolve some of the causation or endogene-
ity issues inherent in a claim about the strength of soft law organizations in
implementing norms that lead to higher quality enforcement efforts. Anec-
dotally, all antitrust officials to whom I spoke suggested that the soft law
interaction has increased the quality of their knowledge, the agency's deci-
sion-making, and the prioritization of enforcement and non-enforcement
work. In some cases, we can point to specific public successes of soft law
159. In recent years, Mexico has become a full OECD member, and for purposes of competition
policy issues, Argentina and Brazil have observer status.
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organizations. The ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notification
and Review Procedures were highly influential in the Brazilian agencies'
redesign of their merger review system to standards in line with these rec-
ommended practices.160 These recommended practices also shaped some of
the proposed legislative changes in Brazilian merger control, as did the
OECD peer review of Brazilian antitrust in 2005.161 Similarly, ICN work in
cartel leniency helped shape Brazilian regulations in this area. 162 In Chile,
ICN work has helped to build support for an amendment to Chile's compe-
tition law to expand the investigatory power of the antitrust agency. 163 In
El Salvador, the ICN has helped to partner the new Salvadorian antitrust
agency with the Brazilian agencies to help the Salvadorian agency with
mentoring. Among countries in the region, many have undertaken reviews
of their merger control procedures based on ICN recommended prac-
tices. 164
d. The symbolic value of chapters explains their inclusion.
An understanding of a contract as a ceremonial tool suggests that the
importance of the competition policy chapter is in its form. 165 Even if there
is no formal enforcement of PTA competition policy chapters through ad-
judication, these chapters may have power through symbolic meaning. This
symbolism signals a certain reputational and branding effect about the im-
portance of competition policy to a country's economy. 166 Symbolism may
help to shape norms of competition within a country. 16 7 Many of the PTAs
160. Int'l Competition Network [ICN], Implementation of the ICN Recommended Practices for
Merger Notification and Review Procedures 9 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.intemational
competitionnetwork.org/media/archive06l1/05O5O5MergerNP-ImplementationRpt.pdf.
161. The review can be found at OECD and Inter-American Development Bank [IDB], Competi-
tion Law and Policy in Brazil: A Peer Review (2005) (prepared by Jay Shaffer), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/45/35445196.pdf.
162. Maria Coppola Tineo, The International Competition Network: An Update for the Americas,
2008 GLOBAL COMPETITION REV. (SPECIAL REPORT: THE ANTITRUST REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS) 5,
available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/ara/02-icn.cfm.
163. Id.
164. J. William Rowley & A. Neil Campbell, Implementation of the ICN's Recommended Merger
Practices: A Work-in-(Early)-Progress, ANTITRUST SOURCE, July 2005, available at http://www.
abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/05/07/Ju1O5-Rowley7=28f.pdf.
165. Roger Friedland & Robert R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and
Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 242-47
(Walter W_ Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991). See generally Barry M. Staw & Lisa D. Epstein,
What Bandwagons Bring: Effects of Popular Management Techniques on Corporate Performance,
Reputation, and CEO Pay, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 523 (2000).
166. On branding, see generally Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
167. On symbolism and norms, see generally John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized
Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 341, 344 (1977); James
D. Westphal, Ranjay Gulati & Stephen M. Shortell, Customization or Conformity? An Institutional and
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between purely Latin American countries have similar commitments to
those found in PTAs between Latin Americans countries and the United
States or the EU. An agreement takes on the legitimacy of ritual as a signal
to other countries that a country plays by similar rules-rules based on
norms of competition. 168
i. Symbolism to Foreign Investors
Regulation such as antitrust may be a signal to foreign investors. A
potential foreign investor would prefer a competitively neutral business
environment with easy entry and exit and consistency in regulation. To
create this regulatory consistency, antitrust must create a credible commit-
ment to ensure enforcement against anticompetitive behavior.169 Competi-
tion policy chapters may be a signal of a credible commitment to potential
foreign investors that a country is market-oriented and pro-investment.170 A
comparison with another area of regulatory liberalization explains how
international commitments may send a signal to investors of credible en-
forcement within a country. In the investment treaty context, empirical
work suggests that developing world countries sign bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) because of the competition with other developing world
countries for foreign direct investment. Countries are more likely to sign
such agreements when their competitors have done so. 171 This may also
occur in the competition policy context. If one goal of a trade agreement is
to encourage foreign direct investment, a country may be more willing to
add a competition policy chapter to its PTAs if rival countries for invest-
ment are doing so.
There are differences between BITs and competition policy chapters
in PTAs. The first is that BITs are binding. The second is that anecdotal
evidence suggests that competition policy chapters do not seem to drive
country behavior, nor even antitrust agency behavior. However, even with
only symbolic value, competition policy chapters may be enough to signal
Network Perspective on the Content and Consequences of TQM Adoption, 42 ADMIN. So. Q. 366
(1997).
168. This relationship involving trade agreements is similar to isomorphism in contractual lan-
guage. See D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations 37-40 (Univ. of Wis.
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1037, 2007).
169. See Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment:
A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 201, 201 (1994).
170. On the ability to signal behavior, see generally Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The
Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48
AM. Soc. REv. 147 (1983); David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80
AM. ECON. REv. 465 (1990).
171. See Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT'L ORG. 811, 811,817 (2006).
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a credible commitment to uphold antitrust in a way that is both substan-
tively predictable and economically sound for foreign firms. How much
this symbolism explains foreign investment behavior remains unknown.
Sophisticated multinational firms will hire counsel to explain the PTAs to
them. The first thing that counsel would tell their clients is that there is no
binding effect to competition policy chapters. However, the mere existence
of the chapter may provide firms with leverage in negotiations with gov-
ernments as a symbol of a commitment to economic liberalization.
ii. Symbolism to Domestic Constituencies
Symbolism may be the appropriate explanation for the power of PTA
competition policy chapters, but the symbolism may not be meant for for-
eign investors; rather, the symbolism may be meant for domestic consump-
tion. Symbolic competition policy chapters may have an impact if they
signal to domestic legislators and the population as a whole the importance
of regulatory liberalization and country competitiveness. That is, competi-
tion policy PTAs may have a signaling effect within government, telling
the public at large that the government views such policies as important. 172
In this manner, PTAs support domestic changes and institutions, 173 and
may be doing so in the competition policy context. 174 If so, the inclusion of
non-binding competition policy provisions may be an attempt on the part of
the executive branch that leads trade agreement negotiations to instill a
competition culture within the other branches of government and non-
government stakeholders in antitrust.
172. See EDITH BROWN WEISS, STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, DANIEL BARSTOW MAGRAW, PAUL C.
SzAsz & ROBERT E. LuTz, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 190 (1998) (Compli-
ance with non-binding agreements may "be due to a mere expectation of compliance expressed by other
states and by the general public (including their own citizens) with respect to precepts that a govern-
ment has helped to negotiate and include in an instrument adopted with the concurrence of its represen-
tatives in an international organ.").
173. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in
Postwar Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 244 (2000).
174. This assumes that a credible signal is being sent. Take the example of NAFTA. NAFTA
played a critical role in fomenting increased foreign direct investment into Mexico and exports from
Mexico to other NAFTA members. Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid, Pablo Ruiz Ndpoles & Juan Carlos Rivas
Valdivia, NAFTA and the Mexican Economy: A Look Back on a Ten-Year Relationship, 30 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 997, 998 (2005). The Mexican antitrust agency, the Comisi6n Federal de Com-
petencia (CFC) took shape at the same time as NAFTA and barely preceded the signing of NAFTA (in
part so that Mexico could claim that the agency preceded the agreement). The CFC has been relatively
successful in creating a more competitive business environment in Mexico. OECD, Regulatory Reform
in Mexico: Enhancing Market Openness Through Regulatory Reform 6 (1999) (prepared by Denis
Audet).
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The legitimacy of international agreements helps interest groups pur-
sue their policy goals domestically. 175 Antitrust is a law of general applica-
bility. In the case of competition policy chapters, interests that would
support such chapters are diffuse. Consumers (whether firms or individu-
als) throughout the economy benefit from the enforcement of competition
policy. However, interests that might oppose competition policy (monopo-
lists and cartel members) are more concentrated and have fewer coordina-
tion problems. 176 The symbolic inclusion of competition policy within
PTAs may create domestic legitimacy and assist antitrust agencies to pur-
sue their competition-enhancing mission. It also provides an excuse to push
for reform in a domestic context.
Non-binding provisions provide a general means for domestic con-
stituencies to view their own antitrust agencies and their capacities on their
own as regulators. It also allows domestic audiences to think about the
relative strengths of antitrust enforcement vis-A-vis other forms of regula-
tion. For example, there may be a sense that antitrust agencies are better
equipped than sector regulators (IP, telecom, energy) to avoid political
capture by interest groups.177 This could explain why sector regulation has
dispute settlement, but not antitrust. A second rationale may be that anti-
trust is more transparent and is based more on economic reasoning than
other areas of economic regulation. 178 As such, antitrust regulation is more
predictable (and potentially neutral) for foreign investors. This suggests
that public choice concerns of capture within antitrust may be less severe
than that in other domestic institutions. Countries may choose domestic
antitrust in conjunction with soft law organizations over hard law, the bet-
ter to preserve prosecutorial discretion and to limit public choice concerns
at the international level. Antitrust agencies have better information than
trade ministries on whether or not to bring cases through PTA adjudication
that may be manipulated by interest groups that want to overrule domestic
antitrust.179 A third element to the public choice view of the need for bind-
175. See Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT'L L.
501,510-11 (2004).
176. On rent seeking and collective action problems generally, see MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
177. See Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation 2 (Univ. of Chi., John
M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper, Paper No. 312, 2006).
178. See generally McChesney, supra note 39, at 1407 (arguing that the Chicago School won the
antitrust debate).
179. This is not to suggest that antitrust is the best institution. Rather, it is better than the other
institutional alternatives. Even with its economics-based reasoning, antitrust operates within a world of
uncertainty. See Ken Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of Antitrust, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 379 (2005) ("In dealing with antitrust issues, even economic theory does not have
all the answers and probably never will.").
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ing adjudication for sector regulation may be that sector regulation may be
inadequate, but antitrust may not be able to reach anticompetitive conduct
in the regulated sector because of explicit or implied immunities to anti-
trust.
e. Fear of an Adverse Outcome
One hypothesis for the lack of dispute settlement in more recent
agreements may be that a consequence of the use of dispute settlement in
past competition policy led to bad outcomes. This could explain a reluc-
tance to include the provisions in other agreements. Thus far, there has
been only one fully litigated competition policy case under a PTA that is
publicly available. The recently decided United Parcel Service v. Canada
involved an arbitration claim against the government of Canada by UPS for
violations of the competition policy provisions of NAFTA. United Parcel
Service limited the potential applicability of competition policy regarding
state monopolies and state enterprises provisions that are included in com-
petition policy chapters. The United Parcel Service decision addressed in
part whether NAFTA's competition policy chapter imposed an obligation
on the parties to limit anticompetitive behavior due to the state designation
of Canada Post as a monopoly. The Tribunal found that no such obligation
existed. Under a trade law analysis, the use of Canada Post's infrastructure
for its competition services (such as express delivery where it competed
with UPS) were not made in the exercise of Canada's government authority
and had no basis in customary international law. 180
4. Cooperation Provisions
One important question to an analysis of competition policy chapter
provisions is whether PTAs create cooperation between antitrust agen-
cies. 181 In countries in which information sharing is not permitted under
domestic laws, PTAs do not provide a formal mechanism to create domes-
tic legislative change to allow for this type of closer cooperation. When
180. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada, 19 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MAT'LS. 107, 148
(ISCID Arb. 2007), available at http://investmentclaims.com/decisions/UPSMeritsAward24May
2007.pdf.
181. The EU competition chapters of PTAs focus on cooperation. In the context of the WTO
negotiations, the EU took the view that WTO dispute settlement should only apply to the issue of
whether or not domestic competition legislation complied with a number of multilaterally agreed core
principles. See lgnacio Garcia Bercero & Stefan D. Amarasinha, Moving the Trade and Competition
Debate Forward, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 481, 492 (2001). Cooperation provisions were considered to be
voluntary in nature and not subject to dispute settlement. Other countries that included PTAs and who
supported the EU position at the WTO may have wanted to include cooperation provisions for similar
reasons.
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PTAs include cooperation provisions, as nearly all do, what purpose does
this serve? It may institutionalize greater cooperation where no such coop-
eration existed prior to the PTA. 182 What remains unclear is how much
agency-to-agency cooperation needs to be formalized in a PTA. This is
particularly true when the PTA does not provide mechanisms to force com-
pliance. If the PTA serves an impetus to increase cooperation informally
between agencies, it may be worth the cost of including such provisions
even if there is no binding dispute settlement. Many agencies have special-
ized competition agreements for cooperation, which flesh out more general
provisions within PTAs. Perhaps some of these provisions may have a
greater effect than do the more general PTA provisions. However, these
specialized agreements have high transaction costs in terms of time and
staff resources.
PTA cooperation provisions may be viewed as norm-creating provi-
sions to support a legal framework. Without these PTAs, some other coun-
tries, especially those in the civil law tradition, feel they would not have a
proper basis to cooperate. Additionally, it plays an intangible role as a cata-
lyst. Because the agreement exists, agencies might be more willing to en-
force their laws, cooperate with each other, and permit their officials to
speak with each other at conferences. Agencies may want closer coopera-
tion and information sharing with sister agencies in situations in which
there are cross-border effects, or even to gain insights for handling similar
types of cases.
Agency level cooperation may be formalized, but at a sub-state level
between antitrust agencies.183 A number of agencies have signed bilateral
cooperation agreements with each other. These agreements may include
notification, comity, and information exchange provisions. Such agree-
ments also may contain consultation provisions to resolve enforcement
issues and to cooperate where feasible in both policy and legal matters. A
bureaucratic politics model may explain why there has been relatively more
action in antitrust cooperation agreements than in competition chapters in
PTAs. The cooperation agreements achieve everything the agencies need to
better do their jobs. Such agreements will tend to operate below the politi-
cal radar, both in terms of inter-agency conflict over negotiating priorities
and in terms of eliminating the need for legislative approval afterwards.
This reduces the transaction costs across jurisdictions, and would require
182. This may particularly be the case for informal contacts and cooperation between the agencies.
See Peter Holmes, Anna Sydorak, Anestis Papadopoulos & Bahri Ozgiir Kayali, Trade and Competition
in RTAs: A Missed Opportunity?, in UNCTAD, supra note 65, at 66-78.
183. The idea of formalized cooperation agreements is itself the product of soft law harmonization.
The OECD first recommended competition policy cooperation agreements in 1967.
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that an agency talk to a sister agency that shares similar values rather than
attempt to increase cooperation through third parties such as trade minis-
tries.
Some of the closest cooperation may result not from any formal
agreement, but from relationships that are built up among enforcers who
interact at international meetings. Such informal cooperation relationships
also may exist when there is significant interaction due to the amount of
merger or cartel activity between two jurisdictions. All of these things may
lead to deeper cooperation. Moreover, the network of agreements together
contributes to creating international norms that also influence how agencies
without agreements can interact. For example, they create a culture of co-
operation and ensconce the principle of comity. Increased ties allow for a
long-term institutional memory that facilitates cooperation as staffs and
agency leadership change over time.
One hypothesis may be that the push for cooperation provisions in
PTAs comes from international business, particularly in the areas of merger
control and cartel investigation. From a risk management perspective, po-
tentially merging firms want increased business certainty about whether
and when to file merger filings and about the dynamics of coordinating
merger review across countries. Merger control across jurisdictions leads to
transaction costs and uncertainty for the merging firms. 184 International
business wants increased agency cooperation to streamline and harmonize
procedures and operational matters for mergers. Coordinating remedies for
mergers also provides impetus on the part of agencies to increase coopera-
tion. To a lesser extent, the same can be said about cartels. Potential viola-
tors and their counsel may want better coordination among agencies so that
the deal they reach can be global. As agencies may offer leniency to differ-
ent parties across jurisdictions, a first-to-file for leniency across jurisdic-
tions may encourage firms to be the first to ask for leniency, the better to
reduce their total criminal and civil liabilities throughout Latin America.
5. Antitrust to Replace Anti-dumping
For many years there have been calls to replace anti-dumping with an-
titrust. Given the increasing proliferation of anti-dumping around the
world, often these solutions suggest that the WTO should ban anti-
dumping. The more countries that eliminate anti-dumping in their PTAs,
the more pressure is created at the WTO level for the global elimination of
184. KY P. EWING, JR., COMPETITION RULES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: PRINCIPLES FROM
AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE 38, 40-45 (2d ed. 2006); see F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN
INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 7,102-05 (1994).
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anti-dumping. PTA elimination might serve as a model for the elimination
of anti-dumping at the WTO. If one purpose of a PTA is to suggest an aspi-
ration of where law and policy should be as a form of agenda setting (rather
than an agreement of the status quo), the finding that only one competition
policy chapter eliminates the use of anti-dumping suggests that at the
global level, the abolition of anti-dumping is unlikely.
Anti-dumping is in tension with antitrust and international trade liber-
alization. 185 Anti-dumping statutes promote competitor welfare rather than
consumer welfare.186 The effect of anti-dumping may be to facilitate collu-
sion between domestic and foreign firms. 187 Another use of anti-dumping
is by domestic cartels to shield them from foreign competitors. 188 Antitrust
applies a more economically rigorous analysis to claims of predation than
anti-dumping. 189 Replacing an anti-dumping regime with one of antitrust
can ensure effective remedies against true cases of anti-dumping preda-
tion. 190
Only one PTA, Canada-Chile, addresses anti-dumping concerns in its
competition policy chapter. This provision involves western hemispheric
countries with different sizes of economies and levels of economic devel-
opment. Interestingly, this provision affects two countries with very little
bilateral trade. It has not been replicated in any subsequent free trade
agreements in the region, including other Canadian and Chilean PTAs.
Discussions with some of the negotiators of the agreement from both Can-
185. Aditya Bhattacharjea, The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A De-
veloping Country Perspective, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 293, 300 (2006).
186. Alan 0. Sykes, Antidumping and Antitrust: What Problems Does Each Address?, in
BROOKINGS TRADE FORUM 1998, at 29-30 (Robert Z. Lawrence ed., 1998); N. Gregory Mankiw &
Phillip L. Swagel, Antidumping: The Third Rail of Trade Policy, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 107, 111 (2005)
("Since the Antidumping Act of 1921, there has been no requirement to show that dumping is preda-
tory; one need only prove that prices are either below cost or below the price charged for a similar item
in a firm's home market.").
187. See Thomas J. Prusa, Why Are So Many Antidumping Petitions Withdrawn?, 33 J. INT'L
ECON. 1, 2-3 (1992). See generally Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, Measuring Industry Specific
Protection: Antidumping in the United States, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY:
MICROECONOMICS, 1994, at 51-118; James E. Anderson, Domino Dumping II: Anti-dumping, 35 J.
INT'L ECON. 133 (1993).
188. See ULRIKE SCHAEDE, COOPERATIVE CAPITALISM: SELF-REGULATION, TRADE
ASSOCIATIONS, AND THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW IN JAPAN 85-86 (2000). See generally Margaret Leven-
stein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels and Developing Countries: Economic
Effects and Implications for Competition Policy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 816-18, 822 (2004).
189. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Preda-
tory-and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681, 684 (2003);
Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941 (2002).
190. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Dumping, Antidumping and Antitrust, 30 J.
WORLD TRADE 27, 28-30 (1996); Bernard Hoekman, Free Trade and Deep Integration: Antidumping
and Antitrust in Regional Agreements I (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, Paper No. 1950,
1998), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=620582.
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ada and Chile suggest an interesting backstory. Canada first made the sug-
gestion to remove anti-dumping. Chile did not foresee using anti-dumping
against Canada. Consequently, Chilean negotiators did not mind giving up
such provisions. There was no strong business lobby in either country to
keep anti-dumping in the agreement.
Canada, try as hard as it might, could never successfully convince an-
other country to give up its anti-dumping. For example, it floated the idea
to abolish anti-dumping to the United States during negotiations over the
U.S.-Canada FTA. The United States quickly dismissed the idea. A second
hypothesis (one that has received less support in my discussions with nego-
tiators) is that at the time of the Canada-Chile FTA, it was thought that
Chile would eventually join NAFTA. The elimination of anti-dumping
between Canada and Chile would create facts on the ground, the better to
try for a three-to-one negotiating position against U.S. support of anti-
dumping in an enlarged NAFTA. Some within Canada's Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade thought such an approach would
work. However, Mexico was resistant during post-NAFTA talks at the
NAFTA 1504 Working Group in 1995 and 1996. Mexico hinted to Canada
rather directly that such a strategy would never work, even if Mexico came
on board as to the elimination of anti-dumping.
The small number of PTAs with such provisions makes an approach to
reduce anti-dumping with competition policy a long term proposition at
best, as elimination of anti-dumping by the WTO is not a politically viable
strategy. 191 There can be no global agreement without the United States on
anti-dumping. However, the United States has legislation in place that re-
quires the President to report to Congress within one hundred eighty days
before acceptance of any potential trade agreement, if such an agreement
could impact existing anti-dumping laws. 192 Because of the political influ-
ence of interest groups in the United States that use anti-dumping for rent
seeking purposes, it remains unlikely that proposals for the elimination of
anti-dumping will come from the U.S. As other countries embrace anti-
dumping, eliminating anti-dumping will become more difficult. 193 The
embrace in recent years by Latin American countries of anti-dumping may
explain why no other Latin American PTA replaces anti-dumping with
191. Indeed, anti-dumping might be a necessary part of the political tradeoff that generally allows
for the creation of trade agreements. Without anti-dumping, certain key sectors might not support trade
deals that benefit the economy overall. J. MICHAEL FINGER & JULIO J. NOGUtS, SAFEGUARDS &
ANTIDUMPING IN LATIN AMERICAN TRADE LIBERALIZATION: FIGHTING FIRE WITH FIRE (2006).
192. 19 U.S.C. § 3804(d)(3)(A) (2000 & Supp. I1 2003).
193. See Sykes, supra note 186, at 2 (describing the public choice issues behind the use of anti-
dumping).
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antitrust. The Chile-Canada PTA was a failed experiment, as evidenced by
the fact that no subsequent PTAs within Latin America include such provi-
sions.
6. Why do chapters look the same across agreements?
An important finding from the data is that most agreements mirror
each other in what they include and do not include. Of twenty-three sub-
stantive provisions coded (dropping the "year" category), sixteen of
twenty-four agreements were in the same quartile for either inclusion or
exclusion of the same provisions. Overall, agreements tend to look similar
across countries, even when one subset of countries involved do not have
agreements with other subsets. This helps to explain why most PTAs lack
provisions for transparency or due process-even though these are subjects
are so non-objectionable that every country generally pushes for their in-
clusion in trade agreements in other chapters. 194 Both economic and organ-
izational theory literatures provide potential explanations for this pattern.
Within the business organization literature, DiMaggio and Powell de-
scribe this process of imitation as one of institutional isomorphism. 195 They
identify three primary types of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and nor-
mative. 196 In coercive isomorphism, an organization creates structures or
procedures based on coercive factors, such as legal requirements. The crea-
tion of competition policy at the domestic level may have such a coercive
element. 197 External pressure may create conditions that impose policies on
countries that might otherwise not want them. 198 In some cases, for exam-
ple, loan conditionality from multilateral lending institutions required the
implementation of a competition law. A similar phenomenon may be in
place to the extent that competition policy chapters in PTAs require that
domestic agencies be created or take on certain forms or functions. 199
194. If there is consensus on any issue of government policy, it is fair to say that consensus exists
that transparency and due process are worthwhile goals.
195. See generally DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 170.
196. In addition to institutional isomorphism, the process of competitive isomorphism leads to
greater homogeneity. Competitive isomorphism posits that the competitive process will lead to the most
efficient solution. See generally Michael T. Hannan & John Freeman, The Population Ecology of
Organizations, 82 AM. J. SOC. 929, 939-46 (1977).
197. David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SC. 12, 25 (2005) ("Top-down explanations discuss the advance of regulatory reforms as a
response of national policy makers to exogenous (and often common) pressures from various interna-
tional sources on national political communities.").
198. See generally David P. Dolowitz & David Marsh, Learning from Abroad: the Role of Policy
Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making, 13 GOVERNANCE 5, 6-7 (2000).
199. The U.S.-Singapore FTA set out a requirement that Singapore adopt a competition law. In a
footnote, the chapter states, "Singapore shall enact general competition legislation by January 2005, and
shall not exclude enterprises from that legislation on the basis of their status as government enter-
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Overall, the number of agreements in which there are such commitments in
trade agreements for the creation of competition laws is rather small. Most
of antitrust laws predate the PTAs in which there are competition policy
chapters.
Mimetic isomorphism suggests that organizations mimic other organi-
zations because of uncertainty. Mimetic isomorphism may be a function of
incomplete information. Those organizations mimicked are ones viewed as
more successful or legitimate.200 The more frequent the practice, the more
likely such a practice will be imitated by others.201 For example, the con-
tracts setting work by Suchman explores how over time venture capital
contracts in Silicon Valley began to look similar to one another.202 Apply-
ing mimetic isomorphism to trade agreements, the purpose of the inclusion
of a competition policy chapter may serve as a way to model agreements
based on those of the United States or the EU. Once the United States and
the EU began to include non-binding competition policy chapters in their
PTAs, other countries may have taken on the same form of agreement be-
cause of the belief that U.S. and EU views on inclusion signaled legitimacy
for competition policy chapters. NAFTA was the first of the current wave
of PTAs to include a non-binding competition policy chapter, and the EU
soon followed by including competition policy chapters in its association
agreements. Other countries may have followed the U.S. or EU model of
including such chapters.
Under normative isomorphism, an organization adopts structures or
procedures because such structures or approaches are assumed to be supe-
rior based on prevailing thought. The better the idea, the greater the likeli-
hood that it will be adopted and win out over alternative ideas. 203 The
weakness of this approach is that as norms take hold, policies or organiza-
tional structures follow the norm, even though the norm may no longer be
prises." Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 12.2.1, n.12-1, May 6, 2003, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore-FTA/FinalTexts/asset-upload-file
708_4036.pdf.
200. See Scharfstein & Stein, supra note 170.
201, See Pamela R. Haunschild & Anne S. Miner, Modes of Interorganizational Imitation. The
Effects of Outcome Salience and Uncertainty, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 472, 474-75 (1997) (providing a
literature review on the empirical studies in frequency-based imitation). See generally Joseph Ga-
laskiewicz & Stanley Wasserman, Mimetic Processes within an Interorganizational Field. An Empiri-
cal Test, 34 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 454, 454-56 (1989).
202. Mark C. Suchman, On Advice of Counsel: Law Firms and Venture Capital Funds as Informa-
tion Intermediaries in the Structuration of Silicon Valley (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on
file with Crown Library, Stanford University).
203. See Hannan & Freeman, supra note 196, at 933.
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the most efficient solution as economic thinking changes. 204 Antitrust
norms do not require dispute settlement because those established norms
focus on the harmonization of best practices on cartels and mergers. In the
areas of cartels and mergers, the primary issue is one of private restraints
rather than government restraints. Because trade law is based on govern-
ment restraints, it is not an effective tool to address the primary areas in
which cooperation and coordination between agencies would be beneficial.
Antitrust norms do not seem to be diffused primarily from existing formal
agreements. Rather, norm diffusion based on repeat iterations seems to be
occurring through soft law antitrust institutions and informal agency-to-
agency cooperation. More formalized institutions with trade remedies
might create the possibility of formal legal battles in which agencies would
have to side with their countries. This could create ill will between agencies
and hamper what has become a golden age of increased cooperation, coor-
dination, and norm diffusion in antitrust.
The economics literature also suggests that over a given time period,
competitors will imitate successful strategies. 205 This is a process of firm
evolution, where firms will evolve towards the perceived best strategies. 206
Often, this is a process that occurs through routines. 207 Contractual provi-
sions may take on imitation strategies similar to those of an organizational
structure. If competition policy chapters in PTAs are perceived to be suc-
cessful because of what they cover and how they are used, the chapters and
provisions therein will be imitated in other agreements and by other parties.
The routine negotiation of agreements and the easy access to copies of
existing agreements help to create the notion of what makes for the most
effective agreements. As "successful" competition policy chapters emerge,
this increases the likelihood that other chapters will them as a template. The
204. See MICHAEL T. HANNAN & GLENN R. CARROLL, DYNAMICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL
POPULATIONS: DENSITY, LEGITIMATION, AND COMPETITION (1992); MICHAEL L. TUSHMAN &
CHARLES A. O'REILLY Ill, WINNING THROUGH INNOVATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEADING
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND RENEWAL 29-35 (rev. ed. 2002).
205. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics and Sociology of Organization: Promoting a
Dialogue, in INDUSTRIES, FIRMS, AND JOBS: SOCIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES 182-83
(George Farkas & Paula England eds., 1988); Armen A. Alchian, Biological Analogies in the Theory of
the Firm: Comment, 43 AM. ECON. REV. 600 (1953); Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and
Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950); Douglas Gale & Robert W. Rosenthal, Experimenta-
tion, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability, 84 J. ECON. THEORY 1 (1999); Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Code-
termination, 52 J. BUS. 469 (1979).
206. There is related literature in how technological innovation impacts diffusion. See, e.g.,
EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 12-17, 138-48 (3rd ed. 1983); Zvi Griliches,
Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technological Change, 25 ECONOMETRICA 501
(1957).
207. See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE 14-19 (1982).
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imitation approach leads to certain potential weaknesses, however, as or-
ganizations may not implement chapters effectively and may become
locked into an inefficient approach because of path dependence. 20 8 If, at a
future point in time, it turns out that such an evolutionary change towards a
particular agreement structure may no longer be the most efficient, the
imitation approach may limit the opportunity to correct the structure in
place without a new agreement or revisions to the competition policy chap-
ters.
CONCLUSION
This article analyzes how Latin American countries have sought to
address issues of law and development within one particular regulatory
field that supports a market-based economic system-antitrust. In an in-
creasingly global market, given various domestic institutional malfunctions
based on capacity constraints, Latin American countries have increasingly
pushed for international solutions to strengthen their domestic institutions.
An emphasis in recent years has been on the inclusion of competition pol-
icy chapters in free trade agreements. In analyzing Latin American free
trade agreements from 1992-2006 across twenty-four types of provisions in
competition policy chapters, the main finding of this article is that unlike
other areas of law covered by international trade agreements, antitrust
chapters are non-binding, specifically in relation to the traditional core of
antitrust activities such as mergers, monopolization/dominance, and cartels.
A number of factors may explain why, given this non-binding nature,
countries include such chapters in their PTAs, even if competition policy
chapters have only symbolic value. These factors include the potential
symbolic value of such agreements, the ability of these agreements to fa-
cilitate relationships across antitrust agencies, the signal that the agree-
ments may send to domestic constituencies, and the belief that antitrust
agencies need less international intervention than other substantive areas of
law because of the strength of soft law international antitrust institutions.
These findings and conclusions suggest a need for additional scholarship to
flesh out the various rationales for these agreements. As a policy matter, if
creating these agreements comes at a low cost, their symbolic value in
promoting pro-competitive reform and a competition culture at the domes-
tic level outweighs the costs of negotiating such agreements. If, on the
other hand, agencies spend significant resources on negotiating these provi-
208. Richard N. Langlois, Economic Change and the Boundaries of the Firm, 144 J. INST. &
THEORETICAL ECON. 635, 650-55 (1988).
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sions-resources that they might otherwise spend on improving agency
capacities, cooperating with sister agencies directly or through soft law
organizations, or in identifying and bringing good cases-the costs of com-
petition policy chapters outweigh any benefits that these symbolic chapters
may provide.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX I. CODING OF PROVISIONS TO PTAS
Some provisions are general in their application. "Year" means the
year in which the parties signed the trade agreement. "Competition laws at
time of agreement" refers to whether, at the time of the signing of the PTA,
all signatories had a competition law. "Adopt, maintain, apply competition
measures" broadly refers to provisions that require parties to have a struc-
ture in place to adopt, maintain, and apply competition measures domesti-
cally.
A number of the provisions refer to cooperation-related issues. "Gen-
eral cooperation" is a broad requirement that parties cooperate with each
other. "Notification" provisions create a requirement for the parties to no-
tify one another of enforcement that affects both parties. "Evidence and/or
information exchange" relates to provisions that facilitate a cooperative
exchange of information between antitrust agencies. "Consultations" apply
to cooperation provisions and provide for the parties to consult with each
other on matters which arise under the PTA. "Negative comity" provisions
refer to situations in which one country's antitrust agency considers the
interests of the other party in making an enforcement decision. "Positive
comity" provisions permit for one party's antitrust enforcer to have the
other take action against conduct that affects the interests of the requesting
party.I
Some provisions refer to specific forms of anticompetitive conduct
that competition policy chapters may cover. "Anticompetitive agreements"
are agreements among competitor firms which may result in harm to com-
petition. "Abuse of dominance/monopolization" addresses behavior by
firms that can use their dominant/monopoly position to monopolize a given
market. "State aid/subsidies" refer to provisions that address issues of
grants of public subsidies or aids that may negatively affect competition.
"Mergers" are provisions that address anticompetitive mergers of firms.
"State enterprises/state monopolies" provisions address those situations in
which the government has designated monopolies in certain industries or
sectors. It also reflects situations in which provisions exist for state enter-
1. In theory, positive comity agreements reduce incidents in which one jurisdiction seeks extra-
territorial application of its antitrust law. They also increase enforcement efficiency by reducing agency
duplication. Positive comity also may be utilized to reduce inconsistent remedies. Without positive
comity, complainants may engage in forum shopping to look for the strictest jurisdiction. When this
jurisdiction is not one in which there is a strong jurisdictional nexus to the underlying conduct, this may
lead to inconsistent or inappropriate remedies.
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prises. The provisions within this category include mention of state mo-
nopolies and state enterprises, but do not distinguish between coverage and
exemption from the agreement. These designations have their basis in trade
law in GATT Article XVII, rather than antitrust law.
A number of provisions have a direct import from trade law. "Non-
discrimination" includes most favored nation and national treatment princi-
ples of trade law. "Non-discrimination only for state enterprises/state mo-
nopolies" refers to those provisions that limit non-discrimination to specific
provisions addressing state enterprises and/or state monopolies. "Due proc-
ess" refers to provisions that address due process concerns such as fair,
prompt, and effective resolution of disputes. "Transparency" provisions
address concerns of openness and predictability. "Elimination of anti-
dumping" provisions involve provisions that eliminate anti-dumping reme-
dies between the parties and replace them with antitrust remedies that are
based on harm to competition rather than harm to competitors. "Trade con-
sultations" provide for consultations between the governments concerned
in a potential dispute. "Binding dispute settlement" refers to an agreement's
inclusion of third-party adjudication for disputes arising from potential
violations of provisions under the competition policy chapter. "Dispute
settlement outside of state enterprises/designated monopolies" examines
whether agreements that have dispute settlement provisions cover antitrust
violations (for example, mergers, unilateral conduct, and coordinated con-
duct) rather than competition policy provisions relating to state enter-
prises/designated monopolies.
Other provisions that appear at least once include "technical assis-
tance/capacity building." These provisions articulate a need for increasing
the capacity and effectiveness of the antitrust agencies covered under the
agreement. "Antitrust immunities" refer to provisions that address exemp-
tions or exceptions from antitrust for a particular sector, firm, or type of
conduct. It does not distinguish between provisions that create immunities
and those that limit immunities.
2008]
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APPENDIX II. LATIN AMERICAN PTA COMPETITION POLICY CHAPTER
PROVISIONS
- 0F
z o.
U >
Canada - Chile 1996 x x x x x x
Canada - Costa Rica 2001 x x x x x x
CARICOM - Costa Rica 2004 x x
Central America - Chile 2002 x
Central America - Domini- 19
can Republic
Central America - Panama 2002 x x
Chile - EFTA 2003 x x x x x x
Chile - Brunei - 20
New Zealand - Singapore
Chile - EU 2002 x x x x x x
Chile - MERCOSUR 1996 x x x
Chile - Mexico 1998 x x x x x x
Chile - Peru 2006 x x x x x x
Chile - South Korea 2003 x x x x x x
Chile - U.S. 2003 x x x x x x
Colombia - Mexico - 19
Venezuela
EU - Mexico 2000 x x x x x x
EFTA - Mexico 2000 x x x x x x
Japan - Mexico 2004 x x x x x x
Mexico - Israel 2000 x x x x x x
Mexico - Uruguay 2003 x x x x x x
NAFTA 1992 x x x x x x
Panama - Taiwan 2 x x x x x x
Panama - Singapore 2006 x x x x x
Peru - MERCOSUR 2005 x x
Total 24 21 22 A a i16 17 18
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Canada - Chile x
Canada - Costa Rica x x x
CARICOM - Costa Rica
Central America - Chile x
Central America - Do-
minican Republic x
Central America - Pa-
x
nama
Chile - EFTA x x x
Chile - Brunei - NewZea and- Singapore x x x
Chile - EU x x
Chile - MERCOSUR
Chile - Mexico x xChile - Peru x
Chile - South Korea x x
Chile - U.S. x x
Colombia - Mexico -
VenezuelaEU - Mexico x x x x
EFTA - Mexico x x x xJapan - Mexico x
Mexico - Israel x
Mexico - Uruguay x
NAFTA x X
Panama - Taiwan x
Panama - Singaporex x x
Peru - MERCOSUR
Total 4 2 8 11 1 4 17
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2.
w 0
0 Z
Canada - Costa Rica x x xx
CARICOM - Costa Rica
Central America - Chile x xx x
Central America -
Dominican Republic x x
Central America - Panama
Chile - EFTA x x x
Chile - Brunei -
New Zealand - Singapore x
Chile - EU x
Chile - MERCOSUR x
Chile - Mexico x
Chile - Peru
Chile - South Korea x
Chile - U.S. x x x
Colombia - Mexico - Vene-
zuela x
EU - Mexico x
EFTA - Mexico x
Japan - Mexico x x x
Mexico - Israel x
Mexico - Uruguay x x
NAFTA x x
Panama - Taiwan x x
Panama - Singapore x x x x
Total 115 6 5 6 1 8
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E 2
Canada - Chile
Canada - Costa Rica xl x
CARICOM - Costa Rica
Central America - Chile x
Central America - Dominican Republic x
Central America - Panama x
Chile - EFTA
Chile - Brunei -
New Zealand - Singapore x
Chile - EU x
Chile - MERCOSUR x
Chile - Mexico
Chile - Peru x
Chile - South Korea x
Chile - U.S. x
Colombia - Mexico - Venezuela x
EU -Mexico x2 x
EFTA - Mexico
Japan - Mexico x
Mexico - Israel x3 x3 x
Mexico -Uruguay
NAFTA x
Panama - Taiwan
Panama - Singapore
Peru -MERCOSUR x
Total 11 1 6 2
1. Only applicable on whether the parties fulfill agreement to consult once every two years.
2. For the cooperation mechanism only.
3. Only when there is no domestic recourse.
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APPENDIX III. LATIN AMERICAN PTAs THAT LACK COMPETITION POLICY
CHAPTERS
Competition laws
Agreement Year at time of agree-
ment
Bolivia - MERCOSUR 1996 No
Bolivia - Mexico 1994 No
Chile - China 2005 No
Chile - Panama 2006 Yes
Costa Rica - Mexico 1994 Yes
Guatemala - Taiwan 2005 No
Mexico - Nicaragua 1997 No
Mexico - Northern Triangle 2000 No
(El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras)
Peru L- Thailand 2005 Yes
U.S. - CAFTA-DR
(Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 2004 No
Nicaragua, Dominican Republic)
CARICOM - Dominican Republic 19981 No
Colombia -Panama 1993 No
1. But sets up a Committee on Anti-Competitive Business Practices for which there is dispute
settlement for a failure of the Committee to do its work.
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APPENDIX IV. LATIN AMERICAN PTAs AND A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
COMPETITION POLICY CHAPTERS WITH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
SERVICES CHAPTERS
_E ..
2U -
Canada - Chile No chapter -
IP not covered
Canada - Costa Rica No chapter- xl
IP not covered
CARICOM - Costa Rica No chapter -
IP not covered
Central America - Chile No chapter -
IP not covered
Central America - Domini-
can Republic x x x
Central America - Panama x x x
Chile - EFTA x x
Chile - Brunei - New
Zealand - Singapore x x
Chile - EU x x
Chile - MERCOSUR No chapter - use No chapter - use
WTO coverage WTO coverage
Chile - Mexico x x
Chile - Peru No chapter -
IP not covered
Chile - South Korea x x
Chile - U.S. x x x
Colombia - Mexico -
Venezuela x x x
EU - Mexico x x X2
EFTA - Mexico x
Japan - Mexico No chapter-
IP not covered
Mexico - Israel No chapter - use No chapter - use x x3
WTO coverage WTO coverage
Mexico - Uruguay x x
NAFTA x x x
1. Only applicable on whether the parties fulfill agreement to consult once every two years.
2. For the cooperation mechanism only.
3. Only when there is no domestic recourse.
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Paaa - iwn.x
Panama- SinaporeNo chpter
2x
CARCO -~
E~
Panama - Taiwan x x
Panama - Singapore No chapter - N
IP not covered s
CARICOM -
Dominican Republic X X
Bolivia -Mexico x x
Chile -China No chapter - No chapter
IP not covered services not cov-
ered
Chile - Panama x
Costa Rica - Mexico x x
Guatemala - Taiwan x x
Mexico - Nicaragua x x
Mexico - Northern Triangle
(El Salvador, Guatemala, x x
Honduras)
Peru - Thailand No chapter - No chapter -
IP not covered services not cov-
ered
U.S. - CAFTA-DR
(Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, x x
Nicaragua, Dominican
Republic)
Colombia - Panama No chapter - No chapter -
IP not covered services not cov-
ered
Bolivia - MERCOSUR No chapter -
IP not covered
Chile - MERCOSUR x x
Peru - MERCOSUR x x x
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